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1. Introduction
The proliferation of human rights conventions since the end of World W ar II and the 
growing number of reservations used in such conventions have given birth to the main 
debate of the second part o f the century concerning treaty law: is the legal regime under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regarding reservations also appropriate for 
human rights conventions, or are human rights of a special nature, thereby implying a 
special regime for reservations?'More specifically, one o f the major and more recent 
questions raised by the use of reservations to human rights treaties concerns the problem of 
determining who should judge the legality of reservations made to such treaties.
Two main replies could be made in this regard. First, it could be argued, and this is 
precisely the conservative position adopted by the International Law Commission, that the 
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties establishes a regime governing reservations to all 
multilateral treaties, thus including human rights treaties, and that it necessarily follows 
that decisions on the validity of reservations should be the prerogative of States parties to 
the treaty. It is up to the States parties to determine whether a particular reservation is 
consistent with the purposes and objectives o f the treaty through the mechanism of 
acceptance and objections to reservations. Allowing another entity to judge the validity of 
reservations would automatically impinge on the prerogatives of States.
The second reply that could be given is that the existing law on reservations to treaties does 
not function adequately where human rights treaties are concerned: the inability of the 
system to cope with protective normative instruments leads to the need for a more 
“workable” regime. In the field o f human rights treaties, a State should absolutely not be 
permitted to accede to a treaty, and at the same time nullify the central provisions o f the 
treaty through reservations. In order to avoid impermissible reservations, it should be 
admitted that the Vienna Convention is not well suited to human rights treaties and that a 
fragmented approach might therefore be desirable. Recent developments in international 
human rights law have demonstrated especially through the practice of the monitoring 
bodies, the necessity o f achieving an objective determination o f the validity o f
For a general literature on the subject of reservations to human rights treaties see the bibliography prepared 
by the special rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the Law o f Treaties on the work of 
reservations to treaties, Alain Pellet, A/CN.4/477/Add. 1, at 89.
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reservations. For this reason, the establishment of a competent body that could objectively 
decide if a reservation is permissible under the provision o f a treaty must be envisaged.
Focusing on these two potential replies, the key issue in this paper will be to demonstrate 
the inappropriateness o f the general regime under the Vienna Convention, as regards 
human rights treaties, to prevent States from formulating impermissible reservations and, 
consequently the necessity o f adopting a more neutral regime for the determination o f  the 
validity of reservations. Having shown that the conventional mechanism governing the 
acceptance o f and objections to reservations by States should not be applied to human 
rights treaties, the paper will aim at identifying and examining some o f the major 
alternatives that could be adopted to objectively ascertain the validity o f reservations. The 
recent trend o f the United Nations treaty monitoring bodies will be analysed for a better 
understanding of the whole problem, and reviewed in order to judge whether the 
monitoring bodies have or should have the authority to decide on the validity of 
reservations. The related work of the International Law Commission on reservations to 
treaties will also be examined to show the contrast that exists in this new trend: the 
Commission's view is that the legal regime governing reservations should be kept 
uniformed and that the monitoring bodies have only the competence to comment on and 
make recommendations with regard to the admissibility o f  reservations by States. 
However, they have no competence to make legal determinations on the validity o f 
particular reservations. In order to preserve the basic rule o f  the consent o f States, that role 
should not go beyond an opinion or a recommendation.
The other major alternatives that will be proposed are firstly, the adoption o f a collegiate 
mechanism for the making o f decisions with regard to the validity o f reservations, and, 
second, the proposal to confer power on the International Court o f Justice to judge the 
validity of reservations, even if  this solution seems to be, at first sight, time consuming and 
would therefore be unlikely to resolve problems that States are currently face on the 
subject o f reservations.
Before going on to examine these issues, two further comments may be necessary. First, it 
should be brought to the reader’s attention that throughout the study, the word 
“reservation" will be used in a broad sense, including interpretative declarations, and 
understandings. Second, the reader should keep in mind that all the proposals made to 
determine who should judge the validity o f reservations will only be made relevant i f  the
2
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treaty remains silent on the subject of reservations, namely when, as it will be seen further 
below, Article 19(c) is being applied.
2. The law applicable to reservations 
2.J The definition o f a reservation
It is essential to explain from the outset, what is meant by a reservation. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties2 defines the notion o f reservations in Article 2. (1). (d)3 
as follows:
“ ‘reservations’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a 
State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it 
purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in 
their application to that State.”4
The most important thing to emerge from the formulation used in the Vienna Convention is 
that the essential criteria used to define a reservation is its capacity to modify the legal 
effect o f  the treaty, no matter how the statement is named.5
rmmm
2 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, entry into force 27 January 1980 
(henceforth: ‘The Vienna Convention”).
3 Other definitions may be found: see especially the third report of the Special Rapporteur Alain PELLET on 
reservations to treaties. The second part of this report deals with the definition o f reservations. For an 
analysis of the terms of the definition see L1JNZAAD L., Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties, Ratify 
and Ruin?, in : 38 International Studies in Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995, at 
32-36. LEBLANC L. J., Reservations to the Convention on the Rights o f Child: A macroscopic view of state 
practice, in: 4 International Journal of Children’s Rights, 1996, at 357-380. GAMBLE J.K. JR., Reservations 
to multilateral treaties: a macroscopic view of State Practice, in: 74 American Journal of International Law, 
1980, at 372-394.
4 The definition contained in the Vienna Convention is not universally accepted. Some writers refuse to 
consider the reservation to be an unilateral statement. For example, BRIERLY J., rapporteur of the 
International Law Commission regards the reservation as a multilateral statement: ‘That word is used as 
meaning a special stipulation which has been agreed upon, between the parties to a treaty, limiting or varying 
the effect to the treaty as it applies between a particular party and all or some of the remaining parties. It is 
not used to connote the mere proposal, by the State or the International organisation interested, of such a 
stipulation..
5 GAMBLE J. K. JR., Op. cit., writes: “It is unimportant what label is attached to a statement so long as it 
fulfils the requirements of the definition. Thus, a reservation might be called a declaration, an understanding, 
a statement, or a reservation”. On this subject see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 24 
(52), General Comment on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant 
or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Add. 6 (1994), § 3: “It is not always easy to distinguish a reservation from a declaration as to a 
States* s understanding of the interpretation of a provision, or from a statement of policy. Regard will be had 
to the intention o f State rather than the form of the instrument”.
The admissibility of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties in a Universal Context: 
Who Should Determine The Validity of Reservations ? Geraldine Veya
2.2 The legal regime applicable to reservations to human rights treaties: the 
provisions o f the Vienna Convention on reservations
The Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties contains some general rules on reservations 
in Articles 19 to 23. According to the drafters’ expressed goals, the provisions on 
reservations were an attempt to find a balance between the universal acceptance of treaties 
and the preservation o f their integrity6. As a result, the Vienna Convention reservations 
regime is conceived as a liberal regime often characterised as a “flexible7 *” mechanism, 
under which reservations are presumed to be permissible and acceptance is easily 
achieved. As a matter o f fact, the first sentence o f Article 19 postulates a general freedom 
to formulate reservations, but then limits it in a number o f  cases, as mentioned in 
paragraphs (a) to (c).
According to Article 19(c) o f the Vienna Convention, which deals with the formulation o f 
reservations, the consequence of the silence o f  treaties in respect to reservations, is that the
6 See, in this regard, Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work of the Second Part o f its 
Seventeenth Session and Eighteenth Session, UN GAOR 21“ Session, Supp. No 9, §35, UN Doc. 
A/6309/Rev.l (1966). On the notion o f universality and integrity o f multilateral conventions see 
HALAJCZUK B. T., Les conventions multilatérales entre l ’universalité et l’intégrité, in Revue de droit 
international, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, 1960, at 38-50, COOK R. J., Reservations to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms o f Racial Discrimination Against Women, in: 30 Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 1990, at 683-684, REDGWELL C., Universality or integrity? Some reflections 
on reservations to general multilateral treaties, in: 64 British Yearbook of International Law, 1993, at 279. As 
BASTID explains “two opposing interests are at stake. The first interest is the extension of the Convention. It 
is desirable for this convention to be ratified by the largest possible number o f State; consequently, 
adjustments which make it possible to obtain the consent of a State wilt be accepted. The other concern 
relates to the integrity of the Convention. The same rules must apply to all parties; there is no point in having 
a treaty regime that has loopholes or exceptions, in which the rules vary according to the States concerned.”, 
BASTID Suzanne, Les traités dans la vie internationale-conclusions et effets, Paris, Economica, 1985, at 71- 
72. See also the Report on reservations made by member states to Council of Europe conventions, 
Parliamentary Assembly o f the Council o f Europe, 3 June 1993, Doc. 6856. See also DUPUY R. J., 
L’universalité des droits de l’homme, in: Studi in Onore di Giuseppe Sperduti, 1984, at 541-556.
7 As declared Alain Pellet in his third report on reservations to treaties, “ *Flexibility’-this is the key word of 
the new legal regime o f reservations which is gradually replacing the old regime and becoming enshrined in 
the Vienna Convention". As noted REDGWELL C., Op. cit., at 5 “Article 19 o f the VCLT adopts a flexible 
approach and permits States individually to decide on admissibility of a reservation”. See also the 
Preliminary Conclusions o f the International Law Commission On Reservations to Normative Multilateral 
Treaties Including Human Rights Treaties, in Report o f the International Law Commission on the work o f its 
forty-ninth session, General Assembly Official Records Fifty-second Session, Sup. No 10, UN Doc. A/52/10, 
at 95ff, esp. at 106, § 2: ‘T he Commission considers that, because of its flexibility, this regime (the Vienna 
Convention reservations regime] is suited to the requirements of all treaties, including treaties in the area of 
human rights and that, consequently, the general rules enunciated in the above-mentioned Vienna Convention 
govern reservations to such instrument”
“ Article 19 of the Vienna Convention provides that: “A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, 
approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, 
may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object 
and purpose o f the treaty."
4
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compatibility with the object and purpose test for establishing the validity o f reservations 
applies as a matter of general international law. In other words, where a treaty is silent 
regarding reservations, the admissibility of a reservation is contingent upon its 
compatibility with the object and purpose of the convention to which it applies9. On the 
other hand, as soon as a convention has provisions referring to reservations, such rules take 
precedence over the Vienna Convention reservations regime.
Article 2010 o f the Vienna Convention addresses the acceptance o f and objections to 
reservations and acknowledges the freedom of the other contracting parties to agree to or to 
reject the reservation. In other words, for a reservation to be deemed valid, other States 
parties must accept it. Article 20(4) deals with the consequences o f reservations as well as 
the consequences o f objections. As a result, the treaty will be divided into a network of 
bilateral agreements between two contracting parties which are bound by the treaty as 
modified by the reservation made by one State and accepted by the other.
What should be more closely examined is the link between Article 19(c) and Article 20(4), 
which remains unclear.11 The problem is to know whether a reservation that is considered
9 Most of Human Rights Treaties are silent concerning the problem of reservations or directly refer to the 
compatibility test set out in Article 19(c). The most famous example is the International Covenant On Civil 
and Political Rights which does not contains any explicit rules on reservations. During the drafting of the 
Covenant, this matter was intensely debated without any compromise being reached. Contrary to the Soviet 
Union, which maintained that reservations are an essential right o f sovereign States, Chile and Uruguay 
argued in favour of the prohibition of every kind of reservation to protect the integrity of the Covenant (cf. 
E/CN.4/L.354.). On the different kinds o f reservation clauses to treaties concluded within the Council of 
Europe, see AKERMARK S. S., Reservations Clauses in Treaties Concluded within the Council o f  Europe, 
in: 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Part 3, July 1999, at 479-514.
10 Article 20 o f the Vienna Convention provides that: “1. A reservation expressly authorised by a treaty does 
not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides. 2. When 
it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the object and purpose o f a treaty that the 
application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each 
one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties. 3. When a treaty is a 
constituent instrument of an international organisation and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires 
the acceptance o f the competent organ o f that organisation. 4. In cases not falling under the preceding 
paragraphs and unless the treaty otherwise provides: (a) acceptance of another contracting State of a 
reservation constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if  or when the 
treaty is in force for those States; (b) an objection of another contracting State to a reservation does not 
preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary 
intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State; (c) an act expressing a State’s consent to be bound by 
the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted 
the reservation. 5. For the purpose of paragraphs 2 and 4 unless the treaty otherwise provides, a reservation is 
considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end 
of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its 
consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.”
11 See The International Law Commission Commentary on the Draft Articles, which points out that Article 
19 has to be read “in close conjunction with" Article 20, in United Nations Conference on the Law of 
Treaties, First Session, Official Records, Documents of the Conference, A/CONF.39/1 l/Add.2, at 27.
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to be invalid under Article 19(c) can be examined under Article 20(4)12. In other words 
does the Vienna Convention allow a contracting Party to accept or to object to a 
reservation that is not valid under Article 19(c)? In order to reconcile Article 19(c) and 
Article 20(4) Catherine J. Redgwell describes the Vienna Convention reservations regime 
as a “two-stage test”: while the first stage is the issue o f permissibility, which is governed 
by Article 19, the second test is the opposability of permissible reservations. As a result, a 
State should not be considered as a party when formulating a reservation incompatible with 
the object or the purpose of a treaty (fails at stage 1) or if States object to its permissible 
reservation “with the expressly stipulated effect that no treaty relations shall result between 
the objecting and reserving States” (fails at stage 2)13.
Article 21 o f the Vienna Convention deals with the legal effect o f the reservations and of 
objections to reservations. While underlining the concept o f reciprocity14, Article 21 
formulates the responsibility o f objecting States to indicate the effect o f the reservation: 
whether it precludes the entry into force o f a part or the whole o f a Convention, or whether 
it precludes operation o f the treaty between the concerned States.
12 As put by REDGWELL, Op. cit., "[w]as a reservation which was incompatible with the object and purpose 
o f a convention according to Article 19 VOLT nonetheless open to acceptance by States in accordance with 
Article 20 VOLT?. Opinion was divided as to whether it could or should be.[...]. In reading Article 20 “in 
close conjunction with” Article 19, does this mean that a reservation which has fallen at the hurdle of Article 
19(c) because o f  incompatibility with the object and purpose o f the Convention is nonetheless open to 
acceptance or rejection by States under Article 20(4)?
13 According to GAIA G., Unruly Treaty Reservations, in Le Droit International à l’heure de sa codification,. 
Etudes en l’honneur de Roberto AGO, Vol. 1, Milano, 1987, at 305-330, ‘T he definition of a reservation as 
inadmissible should logically imply that the formulation of the reservation prevents the reserving State from 
becoming a party to the treaty, unless an amending agreement is concluded for this purpose or the reservation 
is withdrawn. However while this reading o f the provisions in the Vienna Convention is generally upheld for 
the case of reservations which are either explicitly or implicitly prohibited by the treaty, only a minority view 
holds the same opinion with regard to the third category of reservations. According to the prevalent view, 
reservations which are incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty are subject to the same regime 
o f acceptance of, or objections to, reservations that applies to admissible reservations.”
14 On the subject of reciprocity see PINTO R., L’application du principe de réciprocité et des réserves dans 
les Conventions inter-étatiques concernant les droits de l’homme, in: Mélanges en l’honneur de Georges 
Levasseur, 1992. See also CAMPIGLIO C , Il principio di Reciprocità nel Diritto dei Trattati, in: 
Pubblicazioni della Università di Pavia, Voi, 77, 1995, at 141fT. See also PROVOST R., Reciprocity in 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, in: 65 British Yearbook of International Law, 1994, at 383-454. In the 
report of the Council o f  Europe on reservations made by member states to the Council of Europe, 
GUNDERSEN explains that even if it is quite understandable to limit in certain cases the automatic effects o f 
reciprocity as regards to human rights treaties, the normal rule to be applied is the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which is explicit in this connection, Doc. 6855, Forty-fourth Ordinary Session, Sixth part, 
29 June-2 July 1993, Working paper, Volume X.
6
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3. Inadequacy o f the Vienna Convention reservations regime as regards 
human rights treaties
3.1 The Compatibility criterion as stated by the International Court o f Justice in 
the Genocide Convention Opinion
The criterion o f  compatibility owes its origin to the Advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice of 28 May 1951 on Reservations to the Genocide Convention15. As Koh 
rightly pointed out, “the International Court thereby introduced purposive words '6 into the 
vocabulary o f reservations, which have previously been dominated by the term consent”, 
marking the end of the unanimity rule. Defending its views on the Genocide Convention as 
requiring a wide degree of participation, the Court effectively argued that the classical 
theory of unanimous consent could no longer be applied17 *and consequently proposed the 
adoption of a new rule: “it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and the 
purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion o f admissibility” . Thus, States 
would have in the future individually to ascertain the validity of a reservation. However, 
even if the objective of that new approach, namely to bring some flexibility among the 
rules governing the treaty formation, was totally satisfied, that new rule should nonetheless 
not have been taken as a reliable mean to solve the problem: as it will be see further below, 
the application o f a compatibility rule to the matter o f reservations to human rights treaties
mmm
15 The International Court of Justice was requested by a United Nations General Assembly resolution to ?i:
answer three questions concerning the validity, as well as the legal effects of reservations to the Convention if:,
on the Preservation and Punishment of the Crime of the Genocide (henceforth: Genocide Convention), G.A., J
Res. 478, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp (No 20) at 74, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L. 125, 1950. See Reservations to the 
Convention of Genocide, Advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1951. See also International Court o f  Justice. f!;
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment (■
of the Crime o f Genocide. On this subject see PLANZER A., Le crime de Genocide, Thesis, Freiburg 
University, St Galien, 1956. BISHOP W. W. studied in detail the forthcoming Genocide Convention, the
Advisory opinion, as well as the reply o f the I.C.J, Reservations to treaties, in: 103 Hague Collected Courses, T ■;
1961, at 247ff, esp. at 285ff. See also ZEMANEK K., Some Unresolved Questions Concerning Reservations 
in the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, in Essays in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, Reservations f
to the Vienna Convention, at 323fT. See also SCHABAS W. A., Reservations to Human Rights Treaties;
Time for innovation and reform, Annuaire canadien de droit international, 1994, at 39ff. See also COCCIA f i
M., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights, in: 15 California Western International Law if •
Journal, 1985, at 6-7. See RAPPELER D., Les réserves dans les traités, Verlag fur Recht und Gesellschaft \l, '■
SA, Bâle, 1958, at 37-39.
16 KOH characterises the compatibility test as being a “purely purposive determination" of the validity of a 
reservation, namely having as its sole criterion the compatibility of the substance of the reservation with the 
object and purpose of the treaty, as opposed to the “purely subjective determination ”, having as its sole 
criterion the consent of all the parties to the treaty, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International 
Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, in: 23 Harvard International Law Journal, 1982, at 73-74.
17 It is “inconceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection to a minor 
reservation should produce the complete exclusion from the Convention of one or more States”, International 
Court of Justice, I.C.J, Rep., 1951, at 24.
1B I.C.J., Rep., 1951, at 24.
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involves major inconsistencies. In brief, the first inconsistency that could be outlined is the 
difficulty, or even the impossibility of defining the notions o f object and purpose o f a 
treaty19. The second inconsistency that appears when applying the compatibility test is the 
question of who shall determine the object and purpose o f the treaty, and moreover o f who 
shall determine if the reservation is compatible with that object and purpose. Conferring 
this function on States will inevitably lead to confusion, as each State might reach a 
different conclusion as regards the validity o f a particular reservation20.
3.2 Extension o f the compatibility test to all multilateral treaties
It should be noted that the Advisory opinion should have been limited to the case in 
question, without being applied in the abstract to others conventions21: the issue of 
reservations more generally being a question to be resolved by another international body, 
as for example, the International Law Commission22. Consequently, the theory propounded 
by the International Court o f Justice has been elaborated, without taking into account the 
possibility o f its wider application23, as it has with hindsight been the case. As a matter of 
fact, it seems obvious that the rule mentioned in the Advisory opinion, having, at the time, 
as its sole purpose the interpretation o f the Genocide Convention, only fits this particular 
convention. As the International Law Commission emphasised in its report, written just 
after the advisory opinion, “the criterion o f  compatibility o f a reservation with the object 
and purpose o f a multilateral convention, applied by the International Court of Justice to 
the Convention on Genocide is not suitable for application to multilateral conventions in
19 On this subject see FITZMAURICE G., who explains that “the criterion o f the acceptability o f  any 
reservation propounded by the Court-namely its compatibility or otherwise “object and purpose” o f  the 
relevant convention was an entirely subjective one which might lead to great practical difficulties”, in: 
Judicial Innovation-Its Uses and its Perils, Essays in Honour of Lord Me Nair, 1965, at 24-47.
20 According to the International Court o f Justice “As no State can be bound by a reservation to which it has 
not consented, it necessarily follows that each State objecting to it will or will not, on the basis o f its 
individual appraisal within the limits o f the criterion o f the object and purpose stated above, consider the 
reserving State to be a party to the convention. In the ordinary course of events, such a decision will only 
affect the relationship between the State making the reservation and the objecting State”. Reservations to the 
Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J, 1951, at 26.
21 International Court o f Justice, I.C.J. Rep., 1951, at 20: “The questions thus having a clearly defined object, 
the replies which the Courts called upon gives to them are necessarily and strictly limited to that o f the 
Convention”.
22 The resolution of the General Assembly which provides for an Advisory opinion o f the International Court 
o f Justice on the matter o f reservations to the Genocide Convention also contains an invitation to the 
International Law Commission to begin “to study the question o f reservations to multilateral conventions 
both from the point o f view of codification and from that of the progressive development o f international 
law”, U.N Doc A/C.6/L. 125 (1950), G.A. Res. 478, 5 U. N. GAOR Supp. (No 20).
23 See the joint dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, Me Nair, Read and Hsu Mo, which at the time 
stressed the necessity o f  being as careful as possible when replying to questions of the General Assembly
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general”24. As Lijnzaad suggested, “as a result o f the Genocide case, the rule developed 
has the disadvantages of being extremely simplistic”25 26. Accordingly, the subsequent 
application of such a rule to other treaties has given rise to significant problems related to 
the determination of the object and purpose of a treaty, as will be seen further below .
3.3 Uncertainty o f the compatibility criterion27
A. The definition o f the object and purpose o f  a treaty28
To understand the Vienna reservations regime and, more precisely, the compatibility test, it 
would be of paramount importance to determine the exact meaning o f the notions o f object 
and purpose o f a treaty29, especially with respect to human rights treaties. As a matter of 
fact, it would be more than necessary to delimit, as far as possible, the meaning, as well as 
the content o f these notions, in order to know how to give effect to the object and purpose 
of a treaty, which is central in the making of a correct appraisal of the compatibility of a 
reservation.
because the Advisory opinion was likely to have a general effect on the law of reservations, I.C.J., Rep. 1951 
at 31 : “The Court cannot overlook the possibility of a wider effect“.
24 International Law Commission, Report o f its Third Session, May 16-July 27, 1951, UN Doc. A/1858, §24.
2Î LIJNZAAD L., Op. cit. footnote no 3 at 81.
26 In this connection, Manuel Rama-Montaldo explains that “the initial ambiguity o f the application o f the 
notion of object and purpose to treaty reservations has been carried over and perpetuated, through the work of 
the International Law Commission, to the provisions regulating reservations in the 1969 Convention on the 
Law of Treaties”, RAMA MONTALDO M., Reservations to Human Rights Conventions, in Hector Gros 
Espiell Amicorum Liber, Vol. 2, 1997, at 1261, esp. at 1265.
27 The International Law Commission agreed that “the Court’s principle o f compatibility with the object and 
purpose of the treaty is one suitable for adoption as a general criterion of the legitimacy o f reservations to 
unilateral treaties and objection to them" but “ [t]he difficulty lies in the process by which that principle is to 
be applied, and especially where there is no tribunal or other organ invested with standing competence to 
interpret the treaty", in UN. Doc. A/CN.4/148, at 59. On this subject see especially ANDERSON D. R., 
Reservations to multilateral Conventions: a re-examination, in: 13 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, April 1964, at 450ff. See also TEBOUL G., Remarque sur les réserves aux conventions de 
codification, in: 86 Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 1992, at 679, esp. at 695.
2B For the object and purpose of a human rights treaty, see LIJNZAAD L., Op. cit., footnote no 3, at 8 Iff. On 
the object and purpose test see EDWARDS R. W. jR., Reservations to treaties, in: 10 Michigan Journal of 
International Law, at 362ff, esp. at 388.
29 For instance, about the Convention on Racial Discrimination see LIJNZAAD L., Op. cit., footnote no 3, at 
136: ‘The notion o f object and purpose of the Convention seems self-evident, but it raises the question what 
the precise object and purpose of the Convention are”. On this particular subject see also the joint Dissenting 
Opinion: the dissenting judges maintained that the rule elaborated by the International Court o f Justice was 
not tenable because of the difficulty in applying the “object and purpose test” in practice. More precisely they 
wondered how to determine the exact content of “object and purpose" of the Genocide Convention, I.C.J., 
Rep., 1951 at 44: “What is the object and purpose of the Convention? To repress Genocide? Of course; but is 
it more than that? Does it comprise any or all of the enforcement Articles of the Convention? That is the heart 
of the matter”. On this subject see BUFFARD 1. and ZEMANEK K., The object and purpose o f a treaty: An 
Enigma?, in: 3 Austrian Review of International and European Law, 1998, at 311.
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Looking at the paucity o f legal literature written on this subject, it remains hard to find a 
thorough definition o f these notions. At first sight, the difficulties in defining the meaning 
of the object and purpose of a treaty have prevented authors from trying to express their 
views about this concern30. For his part, Schabas points out the “tautology” that can be 
deduced from the Vienna Convention: the determination of the object and purpose o f a 
treaty being a problem of interpretation, the object and purpose o f a treaty are to be 
determined, according to 31 VCLT, in light o f its object and purpose!”31. According to Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, the uncertainty o f the compatibility criterion, is due to a lack of fixity, 
the notion o f object and purpose being not a “fixed and static one” , but conversely a notion 
“liable to change, or rather developed as experience is gained in the operation and working 
of the convention”32. Anyway, in some rare cases, as for example concerning the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is possible to find a definition o f  the 
object and a purpose o f a specific treaty, but phrased in very broad terms: “the object and 
purpose of the Covenant is to create legally binding standards for human rights by defining 
certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework o f obligations which are 
legally binding for those States which ratified; and to provide an efficacious supervisory 
machinery for the obligations undertaken”33. For her part, Rebecca Cook emphasises the 
necessity o f interpreting the object and purpose rule o f treaties “in order that their object 
and purpose be given fullest weight and effect in a manner that is consistent with other 
parts of the text” rather than trying to determine “ ‘the’ object and purpose or multiple 
objects and purposes o f a treaty which is ‘difficult and controversial” ’34. She adds that, 
“the general object and purpose o f a human rights treaties are to protect individual 
rights”35. This statement, in a certain way seems to meet the proposal36, according to which
30 “Few attempts have been made to develop a theory on the content of the object and purpose rule in respect 
of human rights treaties. The absence o f doctrine in this field is understandable when one considers the 
problems that arise in seeking the concrete content o f  the rule.”, LIJNZAAD L., Op. cit., footnote no 3, at 81. 
On this subject, see also CHINKIN C. and OTHERS, Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s right to 
opt out, Reservations to Human Rights Conventions, The British Institute o f International and Comparative 
Law, Human Rights Series, Ed. J. P. Gardner, at 20-34, at I64ff.
31 SCHABAS W. A., Op. cit. footnote no 15, at 48.
32 Sir FITZMAURICE G., The Law and procedure o f the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation 
and other treaty points, in: 33 British Yearbook of International Law, 1957, at. 208. See also LALIVE J.F., 
La jurisprudence de la C.I.J., in Annuaire suisse, 1952, at 235. JULLY L., Les réserves aux conventions 
multilatérales, in: 51 Friedenswarte, 1952, at 255, esp. at 269.
33 General Comment No 24, at 3.
34 COOK R. J., Op. cit. footnote no 6, at 661.
35 Id. at 661
36 Examining the Convention on Racial Discrimination COOK R., Op. cit. footnote no 6, at 136, wonders 
whether the fact that the elimination of racial discrimination is clearly the purpose o f the Convention implies 
that reservations to any o f the substantive provisions are prohibited?
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Considering the Advisory opinion, in which the compatibility test was enounced for the 
first time, it is still difficult to bring out some criterions, which may help in the 
understanding of both notions. However, the simplicity o f the Genocide Convention, as 
opposed to further human rights treaties elaborated in a more detailed way37, explains why, 
in this particular case, a precise definition was useless. As a matter o f fact, unlike other 
human rights treaties, which are more complicated, as well as more diversified , the aim 
of the Genocide Convention seems quite easy to determine. Simply stated, the purpose of 
such convention is the banning o f the genocide. Taking another human rights convention, 
for example the Convention on the Rights of the Child, it becomes really difficult, or even 
impossible, due to the multiplicity o f rights established and their specificity, to ascertain 
what is the object and purpose o f the Convention, (i) Assuming that the interpretation of 
the object and purpose o f such convention should be envisaged in a extensive way, namely 
that the goal o f the treaty is the whole protection of the rights o f the child, how it is 
possible to consider that a reservation to any of its provisions might be considered as 
acceptable? An extensive interpretation could only lead to the prohibition o f the use of 
reservations, with the consequence of rendering the compatibility test of Article 19(c) of 
the Vienna Convention pointless, (ii) On the contrary, the acceptance o f a more restrictive 
interpretation of the notion of object and purpose of the convention would lead to a risk o f 
abuses. By the way, very little reflection is necessary in order to understand that there are 
so many interpretations o f the object and purpose of a convention as there are contracting 
parties to the convention . An argument that could be also upheld in this regard is that the 
object and purpose of a human rights convention should be interpreted, due to their 
specificity, in a more rigorous manner than for other multilateral treaties.
37 According to SCHABAS W. A., “the object and purpose test may be considerably easier to assess in 
single-issue human rights conventions, such as the Genocide Convention, the Torture Convention and the
Racial Discrimination Convention. [...]. On the other hand, where human rights conventions contemplate a 
wider range of rights and obligations, not only is it more understandable that a State wishes to reserve to one 
or two specific norms, but also it is more difficult to identify the real object and purpose o f the instrument”, 
Op. cit., footnote no 15, at 48.
3B Taking for example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is hard to identify the object 
and the purpose of such a treaty, especially because of the host o f rights which are set out and protected. See 
also MIGL10RINI L,, in: 77 Rivista di Diritto Internationale, 1994, at 635-654, esp. at 640.
39 According to SIMMA B., Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, Some recent developments, in Liber 
Amicorum Professor lgnaz-Seidl-Hohenveldem, Kluwer International Law, 1998, Chapter 34, at 669: “The 
objecting States* decision on the compatibility of a reservation with the object and the purpose o f the treaty 
remains based on subjective auto-determination, with the possibility of different States arriving at different 
result.”
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By way of conclusion, what should at any rate be kept in mind is that the imprecision of 
the notions o f the object and purpose o f a treaty would have repercussions o f paramount 
importance regarding the regime applicable to the admissibility o f reservations to human 
rights treaties: to judge the validity o f  reservations according to a  criterion so difficult to 
apply will automatically lead to uncertainty and confusion.
B. The difficulty o f  application o f  the compatibility criterion40
In this connection, it is advisable to highlight that the criticisms made of the Advisory 
opinion do not essentially concern the impossibility of defining the object and purpose o f a 
treaty; they rather concern the difficulty o f applying such a concept, which is considered to 
be “unworkable” by numerous text-books, because of the absence o f an objective method 
for determining whether the criterion is satisfied. The dissenting judges have beside 
perfectly demonstrated the difficulty, which arises when the compatibility test turns to be 
applied: "we have difficulty in seeing how the new rule can work. When a new rule is 
proposed fo r  the solution o f  disputes, it should be easy to apply and calculated to produce 
final and consistent results. We do not think that the rule under examination satisfies either 
o f these requirements”^ mphasis added)41. In short terms, the key issue seems to be the 
procedure adopted in the evaluation o f the compatibility o f a reservation: the solution of 
the Advisory opinion would have appeared to be available, if  and only if  the decision o f 
compatibility could objectively be determined42, by reference to judicial or at least a neutral 
decision43. As Anna Jenefsky rightly points out, “the compatibility rule appears to be a 
reasonable compromise for determining the permissibility of reservations to a convention. 
However, in the absence of an authoritative mechanism for assessing the compatibility o f a 
specific reservation with the object and purpose o f an agreement, the rules provides little 
guidance”44.
40 See BOWETT D. W., Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, in: 48 British Yearbook of 
International Law, at 67-92, esp. at 74, 81.
41 The joint Dissenting Opinion, Op. cit., at 44.
42 See especially Sir FITZMAURICE G., Judicial Innovation-its uses and its perils, Op. cit footnote no 19, at 
33-35.
41 According to the dissenting judges "It will only be objectively determined when the question of 
compatibility o f the reservation is referred to judicial decision; but this procedure for various reasons may 
never be resorted to by the parties”, Op. cit. at 44.
44 JENEFSKY A., The permissibility of Egypt’s reservations to the Convention on the Elimination o f All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in: 15 MD. Journal of International Law & Trade, 1991, at 199, 
esp. at 210. According to de LUNA GARCIA A. "the compatibility test is reasonable in principle but 
impracticable in the absence of any authority to decide the question of compatibility”, in: Yearbook o f the 
International Law Commission, 1962 I, at 160.
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C. Subjectivity o f the compatibility test: individual appraisal45
As pointed out by Clark, ‘‘although the standard is intended to be an objective one, it is 
subjectively applied, i.e., compatibility is assessed by the sole judgement o f every other 
party"*46. One o f the most striking feature of the Vienna Convention reservation regime is 
its flexibility in permitting parties to decide freely which reservation should be considered 
as being compatible or incompatible with the object and purpose o f  the treaty, by the 
means of the procedure o f objection to and acceptance o f the reservations. As a matter of 
fact, States might have two options, according to the Vienna Convention, in order to react 
to a reservation. Firstly, they have the possibility to accept the reservation, either explicitly 
(Article 20.4a VCLT), or tacitly47 (Article 20.5 VCLT). Whereas the express acceptance is 
almost never used, tacit acceptance seems to be the most frequent response to a reservation 
since as will be examined further below, States are almost always reluctant to use the 
second option, namely their ability to object to a reservation. In other words, the validity of 
a reservation only depends on the acceptation of the reservation by another contracting 
State. Thus, the judgement o f validity of a particular reservation is purely, and only, based 
on individual appreciation, which is strongly contested in connection with human rights 
treaties.
This being the mechanism provided by the Vienna Convention for the judging o f the 
compatibility o f a reservation, it is obvious that each State will subjectively reach its own 
conclusion, depending only on its own views and own interests, this choice being most of 
the time rather political than judicial48. Furthermore, States do not have to justify their 
decision by explaining their reasons for making an objection. As a result, each State party 
could object and take the view that a reservation is not compatible with the object and 
purpose of the treaty on personal grounds.
45 According to SCHABAS W. A., “the parties become the judge o f the acceptability o f reservations in much 
the same way as jurors vote to admit a new member to a jury”. Op. cit., at 64.
46 CLARK B., The Vienna Convention Reservation Regime and The Convention On Discrimination Against 
Women, in: 85 American Journal o f International Law, 1991, at 301.
47 Tacit acceptance takes place either at the moment a State expresses its consent to be bound by the treaty or 
after a period of twelve months during which no objections have been made.
4(1 According to de ROVER C., ‘The problem fhere] is that action against (excessive) reservations made by 
States parties must primarily be taken by other States parties. In that connection States will often consider 
much more than the mere object and purpose of a treaty at hand. Politics do play an important role in the field 
of human rights, including in the area of reservations to human rights treaties. First of all, States easily allege 
interference in domestic affairs where international human rights norms (threaten to) assert influence at the 
national level. Secondly, an individual objection to a reserving State’s intentions might well trigger a 
reciprocal response in the future as to a reservation the now objecting State might wish to make for itself*, in 
To serve and to protect, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law for Police and Security Forces, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1998, at 77.
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Incidentally, both the inconsistency and subjectivity o f  the compatibility test may be 
demonstrated when, taking a particular convention, and the subsequent objections made to 
reservations formulated counter to this particular convention, it is observed that there are 
almost as many different reservations concerned by the objections as there are objecting 
States. If, on the contrary, the compatibility test were objectively and consistently applied, 
it would have been possible to find out that objecting States had objected to similar 
reservations, due to their objective incompatibility with the object and purpose o f the 
particular treaty. For his part, Zemanek emphasised that objections by other States parties 
seem to be happening at random: “[O bjections by other parties to these types o f 
reservations show no consistent pattern [...] . No State seems to have objected to all 
identical reservations to the same convention, nor have States objected consistently to 
reservations o f the same type made to different conventions”49.
Taking as an example, the Convention on the Rights o f the Child, thirteen States50 have 
lodged at least one objection to approximately twenty-five different reservations. The 
number o f States whose reservations have been objected to is o f twenty-three51. Apart from 
a few number of reservations that could be easily identified as being objected to by several 
objecting States (notably reservations made by Brunei, Qatar, Pakistan, Singapore, 
Indonesia and principally to Articles 7, 14, 21, 37 of the Child Convention), it is almost 
impossible to clearly bring out some sets o f  reservations that have been considered invalid 
by most objecting States. This examination shows that subjectivity is the rule when a 
reservation is objected to, and furthermore, also when reservation is not objected to. 
Taking for granted that the principal reservations that have been objected, as seen above, 
were incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty, why were they not objected by 
other States parties?
Again, assuming that, for the purpose o f the examination, all the United Nations 
conventions on human rights are considered and taking a particular State, party to many of 
these conventions, the objectivity o f  the compatibility test would be admitted, if, that State 
had objected with consistency to reservations of the same type made to different
49 ZEMANEK K., Op. cit. footnote no 15, at 176.
50 The objecting States are Austria- Belgium- Denmark- Germany -Finland- Italy- Ireland- Netherlands- 
Norway-Portugal- Slovakia-Czech Republic. The sources are taken from Multilateral Treaties, Op. cit.
51 The States whose reservations have been objected are : Andorra -  Bangladesh -  Botswana- Brunei 
Darussalam -  Djibouti -  Indonesia -  Iran- Jordan- Kiribati- Kuwait- Liechtenstein- Malaysia-Myanmar -  
Oman -Pakistan -  Qatar- Saudi Arabia- Singapore- Syria- Thailand- Tunisia- Turkey- UAE. The sources are 
taken from Multilateral Treaties, Op. cit.
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conventions. On the contrary, what appears to be the result o f this examination is that 
States act most of the time, if not always, in a rather inconsistent way; as an example, the 
behaviour o f Denmark, when objecting to reservations which it considered to be 
incompatible, is particularly relevant: whereas Denmark has contested the legality o f the 
broad reservation formulated by the Saudi Arabian Government in connection with the 
Convention on the Rights o f the Child52, it has, on the contrary, formulated no objection to 
the same sort of reservations made by Saudi Arabia, in connection with the Convention on 
Racial Discrimination. Furthermore, assuming that the sort o f reservation made by Saudi 
Arabia was clearly incompatible with the object and purpose o f the treaty, how is it 
possible to explain, without agreeing with the principle o f  subjective determination, that 
Denmark lodged an objection only to the reservation formulated by the Saudi Arabia
r-
i
Government, and did not object to the same set o f reservations formulated by Afghanistan,
jili
Brunei Darussalam, Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar?
iil:
It is, therefore, hardly possible to achieve an objective determination o f the validity o f a 
reservation, without relying on a neutral authority, as for example an expert committee, as 
well as an international court, or potentially a collegiate system. In short, what is needed 
is an organic54 appraisal o f the validity of a reservation. As long as States remain 
empowered to individually ascertain the compatibility o f a reservation, uncertainty will 
remain the rule.
52 The reservation stated that Saudi Arabia reserves the right not to apply any provisions or Articles of the 
Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws (Sharia) and the internal legislation in effect, Op. cit., at 
239. Broad reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child were notably formulated by 
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Brunei Darussalam, Djibouti, Iran, Malaysia, Kuwait, Qatar, Tunisia, Turkey. See 
Multilateral Treaties, Op. cit., at 228 ff.(French version).
53 According to the four dissenting judges “under such a system it is obvious that there will be no finality or 
certainty as to the status of the reserving State as a party as long as the admissibility of any reservation that 
has been objected to is left to subjective determination by individual States. It will only be objectively 
determined when the question o f the compatibility of the reservation is referred to judicial decision.”, I.C.J, 
1951 at 44. Even if the International Law Commission shares the same point o f view in regard to the 
subjectivity o f the compatibility test, it remains doubtful concerning the judicial solution: “[...] there is no 
objective test by which the difference [between provisions which do and those which do not form part o f the 
object and purpose of a convention] may be resolved; even there it is possible to refer the difference o f views 
to judicial decisions; this might not be resorted to, and, in any case, would involve delay.”, in International 
Law Commission Report of its third session. May I6-July, 1951, U. N. Document A/l 858, at 24.
54 This wording is used by MONTALDO M. R., Op. cit., footnote no 26, at 1267.
15
m m m m !r 1r ■■ jjüüiü jj II! iff j *\lï fi
The admissibility of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties in a Universal Context:
Who Should Determine The Validity of Reservations ? Geraldine Veya
D. How to determine the compatibility o f  a reservation with the object and purpose o f  
a treaty?55
a) Reservations to peremptory norms
A first step in determining the compatibility o f a reservation with the object and purpose o f 
a treaty could be to assume that any reservation to substantive provisions is unacceptable56. 
It would effectively be considered to be inconceivable that a State, while accepting to 
ratify a human right treaty, nevertheless formulates reservations to provisions directly 
related to specific rights . For example, what is to be thought of a State party to the 
Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of Discriminations Against Women that 
makes reservations to women’s basic rights?58 In connection with this theory, it has been 
argued in a rather extreme way that, human rights provisions, being part of the jus cogens 
norms, are non-derogeable norms. Consequently no reservations to human-rights norms 
would be admitted59. Rosalyn Higgins points out, however, that even if a consensus exists 
that certain rights -  such as to the right to life, the right to freedom from slavery and torture 
- are so fundamental that no derogation may be made, “neither the wording o f the various 
human rights instruments nor the practice thereunder leads to the view that all human 
rights are jus cogens”60. In this regard, Schabas examined the issue o f reservations made to 
peremptory norms and non-derogable provisions and concluded that even if  a reservation 
to a jus cogens norm61 is clearly illegal, it remains difficult to identify which human rights
ss See SHERMAN E. F. JR., The U.S Death Penalty Reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Exposing the limitations o f the Flexible System Governing Treaty Formation, in: 29 Texas 
International Law Journal, 1994, at 69ff. He quoted Professor Bernard Oxman who declared that “to interpret 
and to apply the object and purpose criterion in the case of any given Article o f this vast and complex 
Convention [the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] would be exceedingly difficult, if not 
impossible”, OXMAN B., The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the Eighth Session, 
1979, in: 74 American Journal of International Law, 1980, at 35.
56 This is the approach expressed by Judge de MEYER of the European Court of Justice in his individual 
concurring opinion in the case Belilos against Switzerland, Belilos Case, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R., Ser. A, 1988.
57 The US ratification o f the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with a high rate of 
reservations, especially reservations to the provisions aimed at safeguarding the prohibition of the death 
penalty, resuscitated the problems linked with this statement.
i8 SCHABAS William agrees but emphasised the difficulty o f evidence, given an example related to the 
Convention on the Rights o f the Child: “A large number of reservations have been made to the provisions 
concerning adoption. It would be difficult to conclude that this issue is so fundamental to the Convention as 
to render such reservations contrary to its object and purpose.”. SCHABAS, Reservations to the Convention 
on the Rights o f the Child, in: 18 Human Rights Quarterly, 1996, at 472-491, csp. at 480.
59 See de MEYER, Op. cit. footnote no 56.
60 HIGGINS R., Derogations under human rights treaties, in: 48 British Yearbook of International Law, 
1976-1977, at 282.
61 This issue also raises the question o f the effect o f  the persistent objector rule on the principles governing 
the formulation of reservations: the case o f the United States and their reservation to the death penalty 
provision perfectly illustrates the problem: assuming the death penalty provision as being part o f  the jus 
cogens norms, the reservation of the United States to that provision should be considered incompatible with
16
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norms fall into that classification* 62. For his part, Sherman, appraising the United States’ 
death penalty reservation related to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, argues that the non-derogable nature of the provision “makes it inherently 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention“63.
b) Reservations to customary norms64
In its General Comment No 24, the Human Rights Committee proposed another approach 
for a determination of whether certain reservations are compatible or incompatible with the 
object and purpose of a particular treaty. The hypothesis formulated is that provisions in 
the Covenant that are also norms o f customary international law may not be the subject of 
reservations65. The adoption of such a hypothesis, and moreover its further extension to all 
human rights instruments, would permit the avoidance a great number of impermissible 
reservations. Again, lets take as an example the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the reservation made by the United States to the ban on the death 
penalty for juvenile offenders, which was considered as highly controversial (Article 6, 
paragraph 5)66. Unless the United States is considered as being a persistent objector67, this
the object and purpose of the convention. However, one might question the effect o f  the behaviour of the 
State that has persistently objected to that provision: does it allow the State to opt out of emerging rules of 
customary international law?
62 SCHABAS W. A., Op. cit., no 15 at 50f. On this subject see the Advisory opinion of the Inter-American 
Court o f Human Rights, Restrictions to the Death Penalty, OC-3/83, Ser. A No 3,4 in Human Rights Law 
Journal 352.
63 SHERMAN, Op. cit., footnote no 55, at 79.
64 On this particular subject see SCHABAS W .A , Op. cit., footnote no 15, at 53-56.
65 According to the Human Rights Committee “a State may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to 
torture, to subject persons to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily deprive 
persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, to deny freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, to presume a person guilty unless he proves his innocence, to execute pregnant women or children, 
to permit the advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred, to deny to persons of marriageable age the right 
to marry, or to deny to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture, profess their own religion or use their 
own language. And while reservations to particular clauses of Article 14 may be acceptable, a general 
reservation to a fair trial would not be". See General Comment No 24 (52), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6, at §3.
66 On this particular subject see especially SCHABAS W. A., Les réserves des Etats-Unis d’Amérique au 
Pacte International sur les droits civils et politiques en ce qui a trait à la peine de mort, In Revue Universelle 
des droits de l’homme, Vol. 6, No 4-6, 1994, at 137-150. See also LILLICH R., (ed), US ratifications of the 
Human Rights Treaties: With or Without Reservations?, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1981. 
See SCHMIDT M. G., Reservations to the United Nations Human Rights Treaties- the case of the two 
Covenants, in: Human Rights as General Norms and a State’s right to opt out, Reservations to Human Rights 
Conventions, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Human Rights Series, Ed. J. P. 
Gardner, at 20-34.
67 On the subject of the persistent objector in relationship with the reservations to human rights treaties, see 
SHERMAN E. F. JR, Op. cit. footnote no 55, at 90-91. He notices that “(as]a persistent objector, the United 
States is not bound by the customary norms. If the death penalty reservation is incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the ICCPR, however, the United States’ reservation ought to be void, even though this result 
would subject the United States to a treaty-based rule to which it has persistently objected.”
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hypothesis would entail the reservation being declared invalid, as being contrary to 
customary norms o f  international law.
A problem that may arise in connection with this approach is the determination o f what
/Q
norms should be included in the list o f norms of customary international law? It hardly 
appears to be an easy task to establish a complete68 9 and exhaustive list of norms of 
customary international law, which leaves the door open to major difficulties, notably as 
regards the recognition by States o f what norms should or should not be considered as 
being part o f customary international Law.
c) Balance o f  Interests
Another solution to ascertaining the compatibility of a reservation is proposed by Kuper: 
“one way o f judging the compatibility o f a particular reservation with the [1989] 
Convention is to consider whether it is so sweeping that it almost make a nonsense o f State 
ratification”70 71. Such a proposal would imply to the making o f a balance between (i) the 
interest in having a State participating in the Convention with a specific reservation, and 
(ii) the interest not having the State participating in the Convention. Even if this weighing 
of interests would show whether the stress is put rather on the integrity o f the Convention 
or on its universality, this test seems to be a rather implicit process which could not exist 
independently as such.
In this connection, it may be useful to add a further comment on a rather old as well as 
unusual proposition made by the International Court o f Justice. The Court suggested that a 
determining factor regarding the admissibility of a reservation could be envisaged as being 
“the degree to which the allowability o f  reservations was contemplated during the 
negotiations stages o f  the Convention in question”11 (emphasis added). Such a solution, 
however, implicitly presupposes that reservations had been foreseen during the 
negotiations. With respect to detailed human rights conventions that have been adopted, it 
is hardly conceivable that all reservations could have been foreseeable. Furthermore, such
68 On this subject see HIGGINS R., Problems and Process, International Law and How We Use it, Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1994, at 103.
69 See for example SCHABAS who emphasised that the Committee does not mention the right of self 
determination, however this is cited by scholars as being part of customary norms of international law, Op. 
cit., at 55.
70 KUPER J., Reservations, Declarations and Objections to the 1989 Convention on The Rights of the Child, 
in LIJN2AAD L., Op. cit., at 104-116, esp. at 108.
71 I.C.J, 1951, at 22, See also HAZOU Linda L., Determining the Extent o f Admissibility o f Reservations: 
Some Considerations with regard to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f the Sea, in: 9 
Journal of International Law and Policy, 1989, at 69ff, esp. at 80.
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a procedure would imply that the use of the majority rule has been adopted as the voting 
procedure: the use of consensus as the method o f taking decisions would imply that almost 
no reservations would have been envisaged as being foreseeable.
d) The insertion o f a reservations clause72
As declared by Bishop a few decades ago, “it has frequently been suggested that the best 
way to prevent problems concerning reservations is to spell out by clauses in the treaty 
itself what reservations are permissible*’ . One of the most effective methods for 
ascertaining the validity of reservations might be to encourage the drafting o f reservations 
clauses, namely either (i) to enumerate the provisions to which reservations will be deemed 
to be compatible with the object and purpose o f the treaty or (ii) to mention those Articles 
without which the object and purpose of the treaty would no longer be respected74. It is 
true that the adoption of a reservations clause system could permit the avoidance o f the 
application o f Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention, that is to say the application o f the 
subjective test o f the compatibility o f the reservation with the object and purpose o f a 
given treaty. Nevertheless, the inclusion of a reservations clause, whichever form ((i) or 
(ii)) is adopted, would not necessarily offer a guarantee o f objectivity. As a matter o f  fact, 
the setting forth o f a reservations clause according to alternative (i) would inevitably 
involve a pre-determination o f the validity of certain reservations by the States 
participating to the drafting o f the treaty. Then, as soon as a reservation has been 
formulated to one of the provisions contained in the clause, it would automatically be 
considered to be valid without requiring its acceptance by any other State party to the 
treaty. In the same way, the inclusion of a reservations clause in terms of alternative (ii) 
would equally necessitate a pre-determination o f which reservations would be considered 
incompatible, and consequently not permissible. Moreover, it must be added that 
reservations formulated counter to the provisions not included in the reservations clause 
would not be automatically accepted but would have to satisfy the requirements o f the 
rules o f the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
72 On this subject see IMBERT P.-H., Les réserves aux Traités multilatéraux, Paris, Pedone, 1979, at 163- 
173.
73 BISHOP W, W.t Op. cit. footnote no 15, at 323.
74 See CHINKIN C. who describes three possibilities for States to organise their reservations regime: 
Isolation, General Prohibition, and Collective or Third Party Determination. She explains that the rules of the 
Vienna Convention being residual, States are free to stipulate in a convention the reservations regime which 
will apply to it: in Human Rights as General Norms, Op. cit. footnote no 30, at bl2. 19
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It is evident, therefore, that even if, in theory, this might appear safer, in terms o f respect 
for human rights treaties, by defining in the treaty itself which provisions could be affected 
by reservations (or which provisions have absolutely to be respected), the subjective 
element in an appraisal of the validity o f a reservation would remain absolutely unchanged.
e) Third party determination o f  the compatibility o f  the reservation
Another alternative in the reaching of an objective determination of the compatibility o f 
the reservation would be to specify that an impartial body should always undertake the test 
set out in Article 19 (c)75. Although this kind o f mechanism is already present in the 
framework o f the Vienna Convention reservations regime, Article 20, paragraph 3 o f 
which requires, that every reservation formulated counter to constituent instruments be 
submitted for acceptance to the competent organ of the body being established76, it has not 
yet been adopted for all other treaties. In this respect, two questions arise. Firstly, the 
question whether, as asked by Edwards, “the compatibility of a reservation with the object 
and purpose o f the treaty is an appropriate subject for judicial determination“77. Second, in 
the case o f an affirmative answer to the first question, the question of which organ would 
be competent to declare the reservation invalid. The reply to the first question having 
already been discussed, with the conclusion that in order to avoid a subjective 
determination o f the compatibility of reservations, States should not be competent to 
undertake this function, the reply to the second question will be discussed further below.
As a matter o f fact, such a subjective determination being unthinkable in respect to human 
rights treaties78, it would be necessary to determine the alternative approaches in the
75 According to EDWARDS R. W. JR, ‘T o have an objective character and be more than a doctrinal 
assertion [reference is made to the statement by Judge RUDA J. M., that the compatibility test is a “mere 
doctrinal assertion”, Reservations to treaties, in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy, Vol. 146, 1975, at 
95-218, esp. at 190], it is not necessary that Article 19(c) determination always be made by impartial 
tribunals or through a collegiate process. It is enough if there is the potential for impartial appraisal. In the 
case o f some treaties, Article 19(c) may be applied by an organ o f an international organisation”, 
Reservations to treaties, in: 10 Michigan Journal o f  International Law, Op. cit. footnote no 28, Spring 1989, 
at 390-391.
76 Article 20 paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties provides: “When a treaty is a 
constituent instrument o f an international organisation and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires 
the acceptance of the competent organ of that organisation”. On this subject see RUDA J. M., Op. cit., 
footnote no 75
77 EDWARDS R. W. JR, Op. cit., footnote no28, at 393-394. According to him, replying to the first question, 
“[Sjome would argue that the parties are the masters o f their treaties. But, should dispute settlement clauses 
in treaties be read to exclude examination o f the validity o f reservations? Probably not. The European Court 
o f Human Rights set an important precedent in the Belilos Case by ruling upon the validity of the Swiss 
reservation”.
78 According to BABEL M.-L., the designation of the object and purpose o f the treaty depends not only on 
the States but also on the international and national communities, as well as individuals. Such a
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appraisal o f the validity o f reservations, in order to secure an objective determination o f its 
legality. Many plausible solutions for avoiding the confusions of the Vienna Convention 
could be envisaged, from adjudication by the treaty bodies, to the creation o f a special 
committee responsible only for the validity of reservations, to the adoption o f a collective 
mechanism, to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal .
4. The traditional mechanism fo r determining the validity o f  a reservation 
and the inadequacies o f  this mechanism
£04.1 The objection regime
The Vienna Convention reservation regime permits States freely to accept or reject 
reservations through the mechanism of acceptance and objections to reservations. Thus, 
each State party has the power to decide, **individually and from its own standpoint* , 
whether the reservation of another State is compatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention. Even if the right of States parties to a treaty to object to the reservations made 
by others has always been recognised, this fails to prevent the acceptance of a reservation 
contrary to the object and the purpose of the Convention. Moreover, there is no assumption 
that States parties would necessarily object to all incompatible reservations. The small 
number of objections made by other contracting States to incompatible reservations reveals 
the loopholes o f the Vienna Convention reservations regime , especially when this regime 
is applied to human rights treaties. In this connection, Lawrence Leblanc declared that 
*‘[i]deally the states parties to the convention would take seriously their obligation to 798012
determination should not belong only to one subject of international law -the State- but rather to an objective 
authority, Les réserves à la Convention des Nations Unies relative aux droits de l’enfant et à la sauvegarde de 
l’objet et du but du traité international, in: 8 European Journal of International Law, 1997, at 664ff.
79 On this point see SCHABAS W. A, Op. cit., at 122.
80 On this particular subject see CALAMIA A., La disciplina delle obiezioni allé riserve e la Convenzione di 
Vienna Sul Diritto dei Trattati, in: Studi in Onore di Giuseppe Sperduti, Milano, Dott. A Giuffre Editore, 
1984, at 7-27. See also MENDELSON, M. H., Reservations to the Constitutions o f International 
organizations, in: British Yearbook of International Law, 1971, at 137-171, esp. at 149-151.
81 International Court of Justice, Advisory opinion, Op. c it footnote no 15, 1951, at 24.
82 On that particular point see the list o f resulting problems established by PELLET A., Special Rapporteur 
of the I.L.C., First Report, A/CN.4/470, 30 may 1995, §§ 105-109. COCCI A M., Reservations to multilateral 
treaties on human rights, in: 15 Californian Journal of International Law, 1985, at 1-51, esp. at 34, writes: 
“[...] the primary issue concerning treaties on human rights is not whether reservations are incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty, but whether States do, in fact, object to reservations made in regard to 
such treaties”.
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monitor carefully the reservations that others make and object to those that they consider
07
incompatible with the object and purpose o f  the convention. Have they done so?’
Objecting to inadmissible reservations: An overview o f state practice
On the basis o f the main issues summarised above, this examination will show the 
inadequate framework o f the Vienna Convention, in connection with human rights treaties, 
from a practical point o f view. Admittedly, taking the main human rights conventions, and 
the behaviour o f States linked to these conventions, it is easy to demonstrate that the 
application of the Vienna Convention reservations regime to human rights treaties leads to 
major inadequacies. Whereas the discourse o f reservations in respect o f human rights 
treaties should be a firm one, without taking into account political preoccupations, the 
relatively high number o f reservations made to major substantive provisions, affirms on the 
contrary, not only the little importance which it is given but also, and as Clark perfectly 
noticed, the “particular need of a workable reservations regime”83 4.
The Human Rights Convention that has, until now, attracted the greatest number o f 
reservations is the Convention on the Elimination o f All Discrimination against Women85. 
However, the more controversial reservation remains, above all, the reservation formulated 
to the provision related to prohibition o f death penalty made by the United States86.
83 LEBLANC L. J., Reservations to the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child, in: 4 International Journal o f 
Children’s Rights, 1996, at 357-381, at 373. Leblanc studies the practice o f the states parties to the 
Convention on the rights o f the Child regarding reservations, especially regarding their objections to 
reservations. See especially at 374-378.
84 See CLARK B., Op. cit. footnote no 46, at 320.
85 The problems created by this Convention are examined by CLARK, Op. cit., footnote no 46, 2EMANEK 
K., General Course on Public International Law, in: 266 Hague Collected Courses, 1997, esp. at 338, COOK 
R., Op. cit., footnote no 6, LIJNZAAD, Op. cit., footnote no 3, at 298-370.
86 The case o f the United States ratification to the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights in 
1992 demonstrates the unwillingness o f States to object to reservations in order not to interfere in state 
sovereignty as well as because of the political character o f such decisions. The proposition of ratification 
made by die Senate to the Government o f the United States was accompanied by five reservations, four 
interpretative declarations, five understandings and one proviso. The number o f these statements provoked 
the indignation o f the whole international community, as they were perceived as a rejection by the United 
States of all the general principles o f the protection o f human beings. On this particular subject see 
SHERMAN Edward F. JR., Op. cit. footnote no 55, arguing that the United States' death penalty reservation 
to the 1CCPR violates international law. See also SCHABAS W. A., Invalid reservations to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: is the United States still a party ?, Brooklyn Journal o f  International 
Law, Vol. 21, at 277, 1995. NANDA Vcd. P. , The U.S. Reservations to the Ban on the Death Penalty for 
Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in: 42 
DePaul Law review, at 1311, 1993. SCHABAS W. A., Les reserves des Etats-Unis d’Amérique aux Articles 
6 et 7 du Pacte International sur les droits Civils et Politiques, in: 6 Revue Universelle des Droits de 
l’homme, at 137, 1994.
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The case o f  the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child11
An analysis o f the Convention on the Rights of the Child reveals effectively that a host of 
reservations have been formulated, which defeats the essential goals o f the convention, 
notwithstanding Article 51 (2) that provides that reservations incompatible with the object 
and purpose o f the Convention are not permitted. A detailed study o f the Convention 
shows that seventy-one parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child have at least 
formulated a reservation89, the number of reservations being approximately one hundred 
and seventy-one, including declarations and interpretative declarations.
The percentage o f normative reservations to this treaty is particularly high: only four 
percent of the reservations are formulated with respect to procedural provisions, whereas 
the other ninety-six percent are concerned with the essence o f the convention90. What may 
be especially noticed and what is especially relevant for this paper is that States do not 
object even to such reservations: excessive though these reservations may be, States are 
consistently reluctant to take a stand.
Taking, as an example, those provisions of the Children’s Convention that have most 
frequently been affected by a reservation91, it is impossible to argue that these reservations 
are compatible with the object and the purpose of the Convention, all o f  the provisions of 
which undoubtedly serve to protect the basic rights o f the Child. Despite the numerous 
interventions o f human rights organisations92, the reservations are usually sustained93. The
87 The Convention on the Rights o f the Child, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1989. The 
Convention entered into force on 2 September 1990. The legal literature on this subject often speaks of the 
four ‘P’s: the participation of children in decisions affecting their own destiny-the protection o f the children 
against discrimination of all forms of neglect and exploitation-the prevention o f harm to children-the 
provision of assistance for their basic needs. On the general subject of the Rights o f the Child see Van 
BUEREN G., The International Law on The Rights of the Child, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995. On the 
specific subject of reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child see LUCKER-BABEL M., Op. 
cit. footnote 78. See also LEBLANC, Op. cit. footnote no 83 and KUPER, Op. cit. footnote no 70. 
Particularly on the text of reservations see SCHABAS, Reservations to the Children’s Convention, in: 18 
Human Rights Quarterly, 1996, at 474-491.The source o f the statistics are taken from the document 
CRC/C/2/Rev.6 (1997). See also the discussion of the Committee on the Rights of the Child with respect to 
reservations, Annual report, 1994, UN Doc. A/49/41 at §§525-534.
88 According to the Office of the High Commissioner, as of 15 May 2000, one hundred and ninety-one States 
parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and one signatory State.
89 It is essential to bear in mind that the term “reservation” is to be understood in the broadest sense, 
including the notions of understandings and interpretative declarations. The texts of the reservations are to be 
found in Multilateral Treaties, UN. DOC ST/LEG/SER. E/17, at 228-238 (French version), dated 19 April
1999.
90 See E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/28.
91 Convention on the Rights of the Child, in: 28 International Legal Material, 1989, II, at 1454ff.
92 The Vienna World Conference in 1993 “urges States to withdraw reservations to the Convention on the 
Rights o f the Child contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention or otherwise contrary to 
international treaty law”, UN Doc. AJ Conf. 157/24, Part 1, October 13 1993, §46. The United Nations
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provisions concerned are notably the Right to Adoption (Article 21 CRC)* 934, the protection 
of Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion (Article 14 CRC)95, the Right to Name, 
Nationality, Care o f  Parents (Article 7 CRC)96 97, the Prohibition o f Torture and Inhuman 
Punishment (Article 37 CRC) . Reservations to such provisions should not have been 
admitted: they risk ruining the Convention due to their incompatibility with the purpose o f 
the Convention.
Looking more closely at the reservations that have been formulated, it can be seen that 
many o f them are clearly incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, being 
most o f the time too vague as well. While some of the reservations are relatively narrow in 
scope, others are wide-ranging and have the potential to threaten the pursuit o f the goals of 
the treaty. Moreover, a reservation that is either too comprehensive or too general provokes 
the same effect as if  there were no ratification at all. Furthermore, broad reservations are 
inherently unclear, especially due to the multiplicity o f  interpretations that one can give to 
such reservations.
For example, it is hardly necessary to even consider whether the reservation made by Iran 
to the Children’s Convention is valid or not. According to Iran’s reservation, the reserving 
State has the right to apply any provisions or Articles o f  the Convention that are 
incompatible with Islamic laws and the international legislation in effect. In fact, Iran goes 
far beyond what should be included in a permissible reservation: the reservation in favour 
of Islamic laws does not only deal with a specific provision but with the entire Convention. 
Using such a clause, Iran might be able to wholly escape from the obligations which derive
Commission in Human Rights also recommended that States parties to the Convention on the Rights o f the 
Child “review the compatibility of their reservations with Article 51 of the Convention and other relevant 
rules of the Convention”, in: Implementation o f the Convention on the Rights o f the Child, Res. 1992/75, 
Mars 5 1992, §6.
93 However, some States have withdrawn their reservations. For example, Myanmar has withdrawn its 
reservation formulated counter to Article 37 on 19 October 1993. See UN Doc. Supplement to 
ST7LEG/SER.E/11.
94 Fifteen States have formulated a reservation (including declarations and understandings), i.e., Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives, Oman, o f Korea, Spain, Syria, UAE, 
Venezuela. On reservations formulated counter to the right of adoption see SCHABAS, Op. cit., footnote no 
87,at 480.
95 Eighteen States have formulated a reservation, i.e., Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei, Holy See, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Holland, Oman, Syria, UAE, Poland, and 
Singapore.
96 Twelve States have formulated a reservation, i.e., Andorra, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Monaco. Oman, Poland, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, and UAE.
97 Eleven States have formulated a reservation, i.e., Australia, Canada, Cook Islands, Iceland, Japan, 
Malaysia, Holland, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the UK.
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from the Child Convention, insofar Islamic laws do not provide for the same obligations, 
which would be more than astonishing .
Consequently, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden have objected to that 
reservation, stating that: “a reservation by which a State party limits its responsibilities 
under the Convention, by invoking general principles o f national law, may cast doubts on 
the commitments of the reserving State”.
In this connection, certain States parties making reservations have also referred to national 
law and values, though by contrast these concern specific provisions: as an example, the 
reservation formulated by Myanmar -now withdrawn- concerning Article 37 could have 
been considered to be clearly not permissible, especially because o f  its general and 
comprehensive character. The reservation effectively stated that nothing in Article 37 
should prevent the Myanmar government from exercising the powers required to protect 
“the supreme national interest”, which include “arrest, detention, imprisonment, exclusion, 
interrogation, inquiry and investigation” .99 Such a reservation without any doubt 
undermines the scope of the Convention: how is it possible to consider that a reservation 
which attempts to limit a fundamental right, such as the prohibition of torture, does not 
runs contrary to spirit of the 1989 Convention and moreover to the general principles of 
international law? As may be gathered from the above, taking for granted that the 
prohibition o f torture is a ius cogens norm100, one could argue that no derogation to such a 
right would be accepted.
Again, it is possible to identify some States, especially Islamic States, which have 
formulated reservations to religious and traditional values, which seem to run counter to 
the aim of the Children’s Convention. The vagueness o f such reservations and thus the 
faculty to interpret them in multiple ways are factors that may involve their 
incompatibility: for example, what is one to think about Djibouti’s reservation101 which 
states that the provisions of the Children’s Convention “shall be interpreted in the light of 
the principles o f  Islamic Laws and Values”.
98 According to SCHABAS W. A., examining the Pakistan's reservation which is formulated in the same 
terms as the Iran’s one, ‘This reservation could conceivably aifect the application o f every provision of the 
Convention”, Op. cit. footnote no 87.
99 S77LEG/SER.E/17, at 246.
100 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain), I.C.J, Rep. 1970, esp. at §§33-34.
101 See UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/17, Op. cit., at 231. See also the reservations formulated by Brunei 
Damssalam, Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar.
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In the light of what has been seen here in relation to the various reservations that have been 
made to the Convention on the Rights o f the Child, and in order to briefly sum up, it 
appears that the vague terms of the reservations, as well as their general character might be 
considered, most o f the time, as the grounds of incompatibility . As Kuper rightly points 
out, “[Reservations must be sufficiently precise for compliance to be properly 
monitored” 102 03.
Besides, assuming that those reservations have been considered to be invalid, how is it 
possible to explain that hardly any State has formulated an objection? Out of the host o f 
reservations that have been made, only twelve States have objected to reservations104. 
Focusing on the reservations that have been examined above, it can be noticed that not 
more that five States parties105 have objected to Pakistan’s reservation, while only three 
States parties106 to Myanmar’s reservation and four States parties107 have objected to the 
Djibouti’s reservation. Moreover, among the few States that have put forward an objection, 
not even one has considered its objection as constituting an obstacle to the entry into force 
of the Convention.
4.3 The costs o f objecting
This small number o f objections leads unfortunately to the conclusion that the Vienna 
Convention mechanism of objections does not permit the avoidance o f incompatible 
reservations. The evidence is undeniable: for a large number o f  political, practical, logistic 
reasons, States are often unwilling to object to unacceptable reservations. 108 As Bruno
102 On this subject see the Article 64 § 2 o f the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that 
reservations should not be of a “general character”.
103 KUPER J., Op. cit., footnote no87, at 113.
104 See UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER. E/ 17, Op. cit. at 238-242 (French version). The States that formulated 
objections to reservations are Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden.
,os Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. See UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/17at 238ff.
106 Germany, Ireland, and Portugal. See UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/17 at 238ff.
107 Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. See UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/17 at 238ff.
108 See LEBLANC L. J., Op. cit. footnote no 83, at 374, explains the reasons that States do not object to 
reservations which are not compatible with the object and the purpose o f the treaty: “Most States are 
apparently both unable and unwilling to invest the amount of time and energy that would be required to do an 
effective job in monitoring the reservations that other parties to the convention make. They may be unable to 
object because o f the weakness of their bureaucratic infrastructure, an especially serious problem for many 
third World countries. They may be unwilling to object for various political reasons. In the first place, an 
objection might be interpreted by another State as a hostile act, and many states may want to avoid giving 
such an impression. Secondly, an objection might give rise to a charge of “cultural imperialism”, especially if 
a Western state objects to the reservation o f a third World state, and many states may simply want to avoid 
being accused of harbouring such motives. Thirdly, many states may be unwilling to object to reservations of 
their close allies, geographical neighbours, or states that they are otherwise dependent on for trade or natural 
resources. Fourthly, states might see no practical benefits to be derived from objecting to the reservations of
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Simma emphasises, there are “political costs of objecting’*, particularly when “traditional 
friendly-or-foe patterns**109 exist* Whereas the choice o f States to accept or to object to 
must be dictated by objective criteria, such as the examination of the reservation with the 
“compatibility test”, they judge a reservation according to subjective110 1considerations, 
most o f the time with view of their own concerns. As far as human rights treaties are 
concerned, such subjective determination of the compatibility of reservation should no 
longer be tolerated.
5. Modem trends: the role o f  the human rights treaty monitoring bodies in
the determination o f  the validity o f reservations
The lack of objective criteria for determining the compatibility o f reservations, as well as 
the willingness to reach a far more effective implementation o f human rights has in recent 
years led the monitoring bodies or judicial bodies11’normally charged with the
other states. Put another way, they may feel that they have nothing to gain in objecting to reservations to 
human rights treaties as they might in the case of reciprocal rights treaty. Nor do states have any reasons for 
believing that their objections will lead other states to withdraw their reservations.” See also SIMMA B., Op. 
cit. footnote no 39, at 668, who declared that “while the great majority of States parties to human rights 
treaties prefer to acquiesce in reservations declared by other parties, however troubling these may be, a(n 
apparently growing) minority of States has resolved to counter such attacks on the integrity o f international 
human rights by objecting to inadmissible reservations and linking such non-acceptance with various legal 
consequences,...". See also CLARK B., Op, cit. footnote no 46, at 314. Clark notably takes the interesting 
example of Mexico, which did not object to a reservation formulated by Brazil counter to the CEDAW 
Convention, although it objected to all seven of the similar reservations made by non-Latin American States. 
See also AKERMARK S. S., Reservations: breaking new grounds in the Council of Europe, in: 24 European 
Law Review, October, 1999, at 510. He notices that the reluctance of member states to object to reservations 
within the Council of Europe. According to Akermark, it is possible to explain this by various factors: 
“[Ljegally, the uncertainty regarding the effect of objections, especially as regards treaties o f legislative 
character, is one possible reason. In this respect, the on-going work of the International Law Commission has 
the potential to shed some light in this direction. Politically, objecting to another state* s reservations is often 
regarded as an unfriendly act which risks to harm diplomatic relations between the reserving and the 
objecting state. Finally, as rightly pointed out by the Council of Europe Secretariat, group loyalty is another 
inhibiting factor, especially as far as members of the same political and geographical groupings are 
concerned”.
m  SIMMA B., Op. cit., at 664.
110 SIMMA B., Op. cit., at 669: ‘The objecting States’ decision on the compatibility of a reservation with the 
object and the purpose of the treaty remains based on subjective auto-determination, with the possibility of 
different States arriving at different results”.
111 This has been the case with the European Commission on Human Rights (Temeltasch case) Temeltash v. 
Switzerland, Decisions and reports (DR) 31, pp. 120 ff., fifth of May 1982, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Belilos case, judgement of 29 April 1988, Publications of the ECHR, Ser. A, Judgements and 
Decisions, Vol. 132. See also the Inter American Court of Human Rights, Advisory opinion on Restrictions 
to the death penalty, September 8, 1993, Series A Judgements and Opinions No 3. See the General Comment 
No 24 of the Human Rights Committee, UN. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 of 11 November 1994. The 
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights are the first organs to 
have recognised their own competence to judge the legality o f a reservation. As a matter of fact, the Belilos 
Case [v. Switzerland] (1988) is certainly of the utmost importance for the European Court of Human Rights: 
here for the first time the European Court asserted that it has jurisdiction to examine the validity of a 
declaration, considered a reservation, which is determined to be invalid: Adopted unanimously, this
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implementation o f  various human rights conventions, increasingly to declare themselves 
competent to appraise the validity o f  the reservations112 13. This new trend towards an 
institutionalised determination of the validity o f a reservation has given rise to a revival o f 
an old basic controversy, between a flexible approach o f  the use o f  reservations and a more 
restrictive application. Looking at the texts o f the existing human rights treaties, it appears 
at first sight that they do not provide any explicit basis for allowing the supervisory organs 
to exercise such a competence, nor do they provide any collective mechanism for the 
assessment o f the admissibility o f  reservations . As a matter o f fact, the monitoring 
bodies were, until now only responsible for the interpretation and application o f the 
conventions, while the power of determining the validity o f reservations remained in the 
hands of States. Notwithstanding their specific competence, the monitoring bodies have 
insisted on the necessity o f taking into account the particular character and nature o f 
human rights treaties, in order to put an end to the confusion that has reigned since the 
advisory opinion on reservations to treaties.
Varying this approach slightly, the Human Rights Committee {at a universal level), as well 
as the European Court o f Justice114 {at a regional level), has examined the issue o f
judgement ended a long doctrinal controversy on the power of the European organs to control the legality of 
reservations, which started with the way opened by the Commission in the earlier Temeltash case (1982).
1,2 As SCHABAS W. A pointed out “it should seem obvious that the courts, commissions, and tribunals 
charged with monitoring human rights treaties and with adjudicating individual petitions also assume the task 
of ruling the legality o f reservations. How can they fulfil this task without establishing which obligations 
bind the party concerned? This issue has been widely debated, principally because of the objections 
mechanism o f the Vienna Convention.”, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, in: 32 Annuaire Canadien 
de Droit International, 1994, at 39 ff., esp. at 68.
113 The only collective mechanism found in a human rights treaties is the one provided by the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1966. As provided by Article 20(1): “The Secretary- 
General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States which are or may become Parties to this 
Convention reservations made by States at the time o f ratification or accession. Any State which objects to 
the reservation shall, within the period o f ninety days from the date of the said communication, notify the 
Secretary-General that it does not accept it”. Article 20(2) provides that: “A reservation incompatible with 
the object and the purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect of 
which would inhibit the operation of any bodies established by this Convention be allowed. A reservation 
shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if  at least two-thirds of the States Parties to this Convention 
object to it”. This collective mechanism provides a presumption in favour of the validity of the reservation. In 
case a State decides to object to a reservation, a two-thirds majority must be reached for a reservation to be 
considered as not valid. Does this mechanism offers a better approach in terms o f avoiding the formulation of 
incompatible reservation than that of the Vienna Convention? On this subject see CASSESE A., A new 
reservations clause (Article 20 of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms o f Racial 
Discrimination), in: Recueil d'études de droit international en hommage à Paul Guggenheim, Genève, 1968, 
at 266-304, at 297.
,MOn this subject see MARKS S., Three Regional Human Rights Treaties and Their Experience of 
Reservations, in Human Rights as General Norms, Op. cit., at 35 ff. See also MACDONALD R. St. J., 
Reservations Under The European Convention on Human Rights, in: 21 Revue belge de droit international, 
1988, at 429 ff. FROWEIN J. A., Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights, in Matscher 
and Petzold (eds), Protecting European Rights: The European Dimension: Studies in Honour of Gerard J. 
Wiarda, 1988, at 199. AKERMARK S. S., Reservations Clauses in Treaties Concluded within the Council o f
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reservation and concluded for the first time that, it is from now on the role o f  the 
supervisory organs to control the acceptability o f reservations in order to ensure that 
unacceptable reservations no longer exist in human rights treaties.
5.1 The competence o f ascertaining the legality o f reservations and the United 
Nations bodies
At a universal level, the Human Rights Committee was the first monitoring body to declare 
that the classic rules on reservations (especially those concerning objections) were not 
appropriate to human rights treaties and therefore that another mechanism should be 
provided by the monitoring bodies. This new conception marked a serious change in the 
cautious behaviour United Nations bodies had always demonstrated in relation to the issue 
of reservations. As a matter o f fact, United Nations bodies, while always expressing great 
concern about reservations to human rights treaties, were still reluctant to assume 
competence to express this view. Taking another UN supervisory body as an example, the 
Committee for the Elimination o f Racial Discrimination has explicitly refused to assume 
the role of judging the legality o f reservations115. The Committee on the Rights o f  the 
Child116 seems also to have adopted a relatively cautious attitude towards the issue o f the 
validity of reservations. In 1992, the Egyptian Government formulated a reservation 
counter to the right to adoption arguing that adoption is recognised by the Islamic
Europe, in: 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Part 3, July 1999, at 479 fî. IMBERT P.-H., 
Les réserves à la Convention européenne sur les droits de l’homme devant la Commission européenne 
(Affaire Temeltasch), in: 87 Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 1983, Tome 2, at 580ff. See 
GOLSONG E. G., Les réserves aux instruments internationaux pour la protection des droits de l’homme, in 
Les Clauses échappatoires en matière d’instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme: Fourth 
Colloquy of the Human Rights Department of the Catholic University o f Louvain, 7 décembre 1978. 
CAMERON I. and HORN F., Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights: The Belilos Case, 
in: 33 German Yearbook of International Law, 1990, at 69 ff. MARKS S., Reservations unhinged: the Belilos 
Case before the European Court o f Human Rights, in: 39 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
April 1990, at 300 ff. COHEN-JONATHAN G., Les réserves à la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme (à propos de l’arrêt Belilos du 29 avril 1988), in: 93 Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 
1989, at 273 ff.
115 This reaction can be justified by the fact that the Treaty itself provides a specific mechanism for 
determining the legality of reservations. UN Doc. A/33/18, § 374. The Office of Legal Affairs responded to 
three questions in respect of reservations as regards the CERD committee, especially as to whether the 
Committee is competent to determine the validity of a reservation. The Office of Legal Affairs explained that 
“when a reservation has been accepted at the conclusion of the procedure expressly provided for by the 
Convention (Article 20) -even a unanimous decision- by the Committee that such a reservation is 
unacceptable could not have any legal effect”., ST/LEG/SER. C/14, at 221, § 8. There are members of the 
Committee who considered that the Committee is empowered to make such a determination: see for example 
CERD/C/SR.156 (Tonga); CERD/C/SR.629 (Fidji); CERD/C/SR. 249 (United Kingdom).
116 As to the question of the Committee on the rights of the Child to challenge illegal reservations, see 
SCHABAS, Reservations to the Children’ s Convention, Op. cit., footnote no 58, at 486-488.
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Shariah117. Though that reservation clearly appears to be illegal in terms o f its 
compatibility with the object and purpose o f the Child Convention, and despite the 
allegation o f one o f its members, who expressly condemned the Egyptian reservation118, 
the Child Committee has made absolutely no comment on this point in its preliminary 
observations119. This absence o f reaction obviously indicates that the Child Committee 
does no consider itself to be competent to challenge the legality o f reservations. As far as 
the Committee o f  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women is concerned, this Committee also seems to also have adopted the view that 
the monitoring bodies are not competent to judge the legality o f  reservations and that is up 
to States parties to make their determination: “ [A lthough the Convention does not prohibit 
the entering o f reservations, those which challenges the central principles o f  the 
Convention are contrary to the provisions o f  the Convention and to general international 
law. As such they may be challenged by other States parties ' ’ (emphasis added). However, 
in its survey of the reservations formulated counter to the Convention, the Committee 
recalled that it remains convinced that “reservations to Article 16, whether lodged for 
national, traditional, religious or cultural reasons are incompatible with the Convention and 
therefore impermissible and should be reviewed and modified or withdrawn”. The 
Committee also stressed that “[T]he special rapporteur considers that control o f  the 
permissibility of reservations is the primary responsibility of the States parties. However, 
the Committee again wishes to draw to the attention o f States parties its grave concerns at 
the number and extent o f impermissible reservations” 120.
Until recently, even the Human Rights Committee had avoided dealing with the issue of 
reservations. In a case MK v. France , the Committee refused to examine an individual 
communication directed against France in the light o f Article 27 o f the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the declaration o f  the French Government 
was equivalent to a reservation. More directly, in 1987, a member of the Human Rights
1,7 See Multilateral Treaties, ST/LEG/SER.E/17 at 231 (French version). See also the initial report o f  Egypt, 
U. N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add. 6, at 174.
118 According to SCHABAS, member Yuri Kolosov “appears to have been condemning the Egyptian 
Reservation for vagueness and suggesting that the consequences o f its vagueness be the full application of the 
Children’s Convention". See U. N. Doc. CRC/C/1, 1992.
1,9 See the Preliminary observations o f the Committee on the Rights o f the Child: Egypt, U. N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add. 5,1992.
120 See the Contribution to the Commemoration o f  the fiftieth anniversary o f the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, Annex 10 of the Annual Report o f  the Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, A/53/318, 26 August 1998, §7, §16, §23. See the report o f the working 
group II, CEDAW/C/1998/II/W.G.II/W P.l/Rev.2
'21 NO 220/1987 (A/45/40) at §127, 8 November, 1989. See also LIJNZAAD L., Op. cit., at 286.
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Committee, Birame Ndiaye, stated in an individual opinion that the Committee "had no 
power to object to reservations of States parties” .122
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on the issue o f reservations123, 
provoked by the United States ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, essentially provoked the culmination o f a reversal of this traditional 
respect towards reservations.
5.2 The Human Rights Committee $s General Comment No. 24(52)
On November 1994 the Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment Number 24 
(52)'24 relating to reservations made on ratification or accession to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. One of the main concerns of the Committee in its 
General Comment was that the objection mechanism of the Vienna Convention on Law of 
Treaties was not appropriate to human rights conventions because of the specific character 
of human rights treaty obligations 125:
“[T]he Committee believes that its provisions on the role of State objections in 
relation to reservations are inappropriate to address the problem o f reservations to 
human rights treaties And because the operation of the classic rules on
reservations is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have often not seen any legal 
interest in or need to object to reservations.”
As a result, the Committee argued that it “necessarily fa lls  to the Committee” (emphasis 
added) to make determination as to whether specific reservations are compatible with the 
object and purpose o f the Covenant for two main reasons. First, because, as indicated 
above, it is an inappropriate task for States parties in relation to human rights conventions 
and second because it is a task that the committee cannot avoid in the performance o f its 
functions.
122 NDIAYE B., Individual Opinion, C.L.D. v France, Case 228/1987, UN Doc. A/43/40 at 257.
123 On the role o f Committee see LIJNZAAD L., Op. cit., at 294.
124 General Comment on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant 
or the Optional Protocol thereto, or in relation to declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, 
CCPR/C/2I/Rev.l/Add.6, adopted by the Committee at its 1382nd meeting on 2 November 1994.
125 According to IMBERT “si effectivement les objections aux réserves faites aux conventions relatives aux 
droits de l’homme n ont pas du tout la même portée que dans le cadre d ’autres conventions, elles ne sont pas 
pour autant absolument inutiles. Elles peuvent ptermettre en particulier de s’ opposer à l’interprétation d’une 
disposition qui pourrait résulter des réserves et d ’une manière générale, de préserver la force d’un principe" 
in: Les réserves aux traités multilatéraux, Op. cit. footnote no 72, at 116.
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5.3 The case R aw le  Kennedy  v. Trinidad and Tobago ' 26
The Human Rights Committee applied the theory developed in its General Comment No 
24 in a specific case, in a decision dated 31 December 1999 involving Trinidad and 
Tobago. The crucial point of the issue was the assessment o f the admissibility o f a 
communication from a person condemned to death. According to the Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago the Human Rights Committee was not competent to consider the 
communication, due to the reservation formulated following the “re~accession” to the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
reservation effectively rejects the competence of the Committee “to receive and consider 
communications relating to any prisoner who is under sentence o f death in respect o f any 
matter relating to his prosecution, his detention, his trial, his conviction, his sentence or the 
carrying out o f the death sentence on him and any matter connected therewith” 127. The 
government o f Trinidad and Tobago argued that “in registering the communication and 
purporting to impose interim measures under rule 86 of the Committee’s rules of 
procedure, the Committee has exceeded its jurisdiction, and the State party considers the 
actions o f the Committee in respect o f this communication to be void and o f  no binding
MA
effect” . In response to the views expressed by the government of Trinidad and Tobago 
the Human Rights Committee first examined its competence, referring to its General 
Comment No 24: “ [A]s opined in the Committee’s General Comment No 24, it is for the 
Committee, as the treaty body to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and its Optional Protocols, to interpret and determine the validity o f reservations made to 
these treaties. The Committee rejects the submission o f the State party that it has exceeded 
its jurisdiction in registering the communication and in proceeding to request interim 
measures under rule 86 o f the rules o f procedure. In this regard, the Committee observes 
that it is axiomatic that the Committee necessarily has jurisdiction to register a 
communication so as to determine whether it is or not admissible because o f a reservation. 
As to the effect of the reservation, i f  valid, it appears on the face o f it, and the author has 
not argued to the contrary, that this reservation will leave the Committee without 
jurisdiction to consider the present communication on the merits. The Committee must, *302
126 Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 845/1999, 31 December 1999, 
CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999. See also International Law Commission, The Fifth Report on reservations to 
treaties, By Alain Pellet, A/CN.4/508., 29 March 2000, at 5.
127 For the text o f the reservations, see Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as of
30 April 1999, at 172.
128 See Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Op. cit. footnote no 126, at 4.2.
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5.3 The case Raw le Kennedy  v. Trinidad and Tobago126
The Human Rights Committee applied the theory developed in its General Comment No 
24 in a specific case, in a decision dated 31 December 1999 involving Trinidad and 
Tobago. The crucial point of the issue was the assessment o f the admissibility o f a 
communication from a person condemned to death. According to the Government o f  
Trinidad and Tobago the Human Rights Committee was not competent to consider the 
communication, due to the reservation formulated following the “re-accession” to the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
reservation effectively rejects the competence of the Committee “to receive and consider 
communications relating to any prisoner who is under sentence o f death in respect of any 
matter relating to his prosecution, his detention, his trial, his conviction, his sentence or the 
carrying out of the death sentence on him and any matter connected therewith”127. The 
government of Trinidad and Tobago argued that “in registering the communication and 
purporting to impose interim measures under rule 86 of the Committee’s rules o f  
procedure, the Committee has exceeded its jurisdiction, and the State party considers the 
actions of the Committee in respect of this communication to be void and of no binding 
effect” . In response to the views expressed by the government o f  Trinidad and Tobago 
the Human Rights Committee first examined its competence, referring to its General 
Comment No 24: “[A]s opined in the Committee’s General Comment No 24, it is for the 
Committee, as the treaty body to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and its Optional Protocols, to interpret and determine the validity o f reservations made to 
these treaties. The Committee rejects the submission of the State party that it has exceeded 
its jurisdiction in registering the communication and in proceeding to request interim 
measures under rule 86 o f the rules o f procedure. In this regard, the Committee observes 
that it is axiomatic that the Committee necessarily has jurisdiction to register a 
communication so as to determine whether it is or not admissible because of a reservation. 
As to the effect of the reservation, if  valid, it appears on the face o f it, and the author has 
not argued to the contrary, that this reservation will leave the Committee without 
jurisdiction to consider the present communication on the merits. The Committee must,
126 Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 845/1999, 31 December 1999, 
CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999. See also International Law Commission, The Fifth Report on reservations to 
treaties, By Alain Pellet, A/CN.4/508., 29 March 2000, at 5.
127 For the text of the reservations, see Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as o f  
30 April 1999, at 172.
128 See Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Op. cit. footnote no 126, at 4.2.
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however, determine whether or not such a reservation can validly be made” 129. T hen , 
recalling the application o f the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it observed th a t 
“the issue at hand is therefore whether or not the reservation by the State party can be  
considered to be compatible with the object and purpose of the Optional Protocol” 130. 
Finally it concluded that “because the object and purpose of the first Optional Protocol is 
to allow the rights obligatory for a State under the Covenant to be tested before th e  
Committee, a reservation that seeks to preclude this would be contrary to object an d  
purpose o f the First Optional Protocol, even if  not of the Covenant” 131. The Human R igh ts  
Committee therefore declared the complaint receivable on the basis o f  General C om m ent 
No 24.
5.4 Competence o f the monitoring bodies o f the United Nations: an analysis
Consideration o f the General Comment causes controversies; besides the hostile reaction  
o f States to perceived unjustified interferences into their domestic sphere, the legitimacy o f  
intervention, and the basis on which the Human Rights Committee maintains its 
competence are questionable for being vague and unclear. Should the authority o f  
monitoring bodies being considered as implicitly included in the function o f interpretation? 
Or should the function o f interpretation be distinguished from the function o f  the  
determination o f the validity of reservations?
The discussion on whether the function o f monitoring the implementation o f a hum an 
rights treaty includes the function o f  determining the validity o f reservations has been often  
debated but never finally resolved132 13. For its part, the Commission on Human Rights has 
pointed out that the authority to determine the validity o f  a reservation necessarily com es 
within the competence o f monitoring bodies: “[t]hat must, logically, includes the authority 
to determine the validity o f a reservation which would affect the scope o f their competence 
or jurisdiction. It appears to be an inherent feature of the type of authority which they are 
given.” Given its character as a “guardian o f the Covenant”, the Committee m ay
Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Op. cit., at 6.4.129
130 Id. at 6.5.
131 Id. at 6.6
132 IMBERT P. H., Op. cit., L’afTaire Temeltasch, in: 87 Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 1983, 
at 610, explains that the question of interpretation of reservations is far away from the question of their 
validity. See ROSENNE, in: 12 Communicazioni e studi, 1966, at 21, esp. at 62. Rosenne says “In practice it 
is believed that either the organ which has competence in the matter o f admission o f new members, or the 
organ which has competence to interpret the constituent instrument, is normally competent in the matter o f  
reservations”.
133 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/28, page 7, § 20.
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effectively be considered, as fully able to control the legality of reservations. Moreover, in 
order to consider an eventual withdrawal o f  reservations, the Committee must be able to 
reconsider the reservations.
Nevertheless, does this statement necessarily imply that the Committee has the authority to 
declare reservations invalid? According to Gros Espiell, speaking about the competence o f  
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in the area of monitoring reservations, an 
affirmative answer should be given on the ground of the specific character of human rights 
treaties and the need to ensure an efficient exercise of the Court’s competence so that it 
may perform, in an appropriate manner, its monitoring function in the area o f  human 
rights134.
On the contrary, one could argue that, in the absence of established rules on competence, 
decisions of supervisory organs to examine the validity o f reservations run, contrary to 
general international law135. As a matter o f  fact, the assertion o f the Human Rights 
Committee, while safeguarding the particular characteristics of human rights treaties by 
ascertaining an objective determination of the validity of reservations, clearly contravenes 
to the general rules laid down in the Vienna Convention. In order that the Vienna 
Convention reservations regime is respected, States should have the capacity to judge 
freely the compatibility o f a specific reservation without any authoritative third-party 
procedure.
In this respect, the General Comment appears to go much too far in ascertaining its 
competence to determine the compatibility o f specific reservations. Even if it were true that 
it is an inappropriate task for States parties to judge the legality of a reservation in relation 
to human rights treaties, it would not necessarily imply that it is the role of the Committee 
to perform this task136. In the first place, to be exercisable, such a competence should be 
established by the treaty in question or created by an amendment137. As a matter o f fact, for 
supervisory committee to be vested with judicial powers, States parties should have
134 GROS ESPIELL Hector, La Convention américaine et la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 
in: 208 Hague Academy Collected Courses, 1989, Volume VI, at 382 (translation from Manuel Rama- 
Montaldo, Op. cit., at 1268.).
135 As declared LIJNZAAD L., “Under general international law, it is for the States Parties to accept 
reservations, or if necessary object to the reservations. The Committee has no role to play in this respect. Yet, 
when it comes to the application of the Covenant, and the impact that reservations may have in this respect 
the Committee is fully entitled, if not obliged, to interpret the reservation.”, Op. cit., at 294.
136 See the observations made by the United Kingdom on General Comment Number 24, concluding that: 
“Even if it were the case that the law on reservations is inappropriate to address the problem of reservations 
to human rights treaties, this would not in itself give rise to a competence or power in the Committee”.
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necessarily given their consent. However, it may be doubted whether such a system will 
ever be attained, due to the reluctance of States to confer power on the monitoring 
bodies . From another point of view, it could be argued that this practice has been 
accepted by the States, without any intervention of a persistent objector, as being part o f  
customary law.
In the second place, taking into account the urgent need for a neutral institution competent 
to decide upon the admissibility o f  reservations, the impartiality and objectivity o f the 
Committee should be questioned. Although it has originally been foreseen that members o f  
the supervisory Committees should be totally independent, one must not forget that such 
Committees are nonetheless created by governments, and that members are nominated and 
elected by the States parties.
By way o f preliminary conclusion, it could be suggested that the modem trend developed 
by the organs o f the European Convention on Human Rights could only be applied to 
systems in which the monitoring bodies are empowered to exercise quasi-judicial powers. 
That is by no means the case in United Nations Conventions on human rights, whose 
monitoring bodies are composed o f public officials, usually subject to instruction by their 
respective governments. So that, in the future, monitoring bodies o f United Nations human 
rights conventions could be competent to decide upon admissibility o f reservations, their 
competence must be expanded.
This conclusion is supported by two major rationales: first of all, by the fact that, in the 
General Comment n°24, the Human Rights Committee implicitly referred to Article 40 o f  
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to warrant the competence o f the 
Human Rights Committee, which provides for a basically non-juridical competence. In the 
second place, the European Court o f Justice, in the Loizidou case, rejected any similarity 
between the practice o f the European organs and the ICJ practice under Article 36 o f the 
Statute o f the ICJ: “In the first place, the context within which the International Court o f 
Justice operates is quite distinct from that of Convention Institutions. The international 
Court is called in inter alia to examine any legal dispute between States that might occur in 137
137 As indicated above, in case of silence o f a particular treaty, the Vienna Convention should be applied as 
general subsidiary law.
See I. BOEREFIJN, Towards a Strong System of Supervision: The Human Rights Committee’s Role in 
reforming the Reporting Procedure under Article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in: 17 
Human Rights Quarterly, 1995, at 766-793, “The system unquestionably has its built-in limitations: the initial 
steps rests with the States, who must ratify or accede to a legally binding instrument; the system continually
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any part of the globe with reference to principles of international law. The subject matter o f 
a dispute may relate to any area o f international law. In the second place, unlike the 
Convention Institutions, the role of the International Court is not exclusively limited to 
direct supervisory functions in respect of a law-making treaty such as the Convention”* 139.
5.4 The Declaration o f  the Committee o f  the Convention against Torture
Recently, following the new trend developed by the Human Rights Committee in its 
General Comment No 24, the Committee o f the Convention against Torture has also 
expressed its views on the competence of monitoring bodies to challenge the legality o f 
reservations and took the conclusion that, in fact, the monitoring bodies should be 
considered as fully competent to exercise that power: “In addition, the Committee against 
Torture believes that the approach taken by monitoring bodies to appreciate or determine 
the admissibility of a reservation to a given treaty so that the object and purpose of that 
treaty are correctly interpreted and safeguarded is consistent with the Vienna Conventions 
on the Law of Treaties” 140.
6. The conservative approach o f  the International Law Commission
Aware o f the difficulties and the ambiguities resulting from the application of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to human rights treaties, and more broadly from the use 
of reservations to human rights treaties, the International Law Commission decided to 
begin a thorough study on the law and practice relating to reservations to treaties and 
therefore, in 1994, appointed its French member Alain Pellet as a Special Rapporteur141. 
Formally speaking, already five reports on reservations to treaties have been submitted to 
the International Law Commission, but only an incomplete version o f the fourth report was 
submitted to the International Law Commission, in 1999.
requires at least some level o f voluntary co-operation by States; and there are no effective sanctions for non- 
compliance with the obligations States parties have accepted”.
139 Loizidou v. Turkey, Publications of the ECHR, Ser. A No 310, §84, 23 March 1995.
140 Declaration of the Chairperson of the Committee against Torture to the Secretary of the International Law 
Commission about its preliminary conclusions, 1997.
,4> On the previous work of the Law Commission see BISHOP, Op. cit., footnote no 15, at 326ff. See also the 
work o f  Lauterpacht who proposed in 1953 four alternative drafts “as possible statements for the future”. 
Law of Treaties, Draft of Articles, Art. 9. UN Doc. A/CN.4/63; International Law Commission Yearbook, 
1953, Vol. II, at 91.
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6.1 Outcome o f the first and second reports on reservations to treaties
While the first report142 gives a framework of its future work and explains that it will 
include a guide to practice in respect to reservations in the form of draft Articles, the 
second report143, submitted in 1996, addresses in its chapter two the issue o f “Unity or 
diversity o f  the legal regime for reservations to treaties”, especially human rights treaties. 
The aim o f this chapter is to determine which are the rules applicable to human rights 
treaties; in other words whether the rules of the Vienna Convention are applicable to all 
multilateral treaties. The conclusion reached in this respect is that the Vienna reservations 
regime must be preserved, being applicable to all treaties, including human rights treaties. 
In addition, the special Rapporteur prepared two detailed questionnaires on reservations to  
treaties144 in order to better appraise the practice o f reservations to treaties.
The International Law Commission discussed the second report in 1997 at its forty-ninth 
session and finally adopted “Preliminary conclusions o f the International Law Commission 
on reservations to normative multilateral treaties including human rights treaties” 145.
The International Law Commission ‘s “Preliminary Conclusions” o f 1997 and the 
consequences upon the authority o f monitoring bodies
The preliminary conclusions reaffirm the Vienna Convention reservations regime as being 
conceived for a general application146, dealing essentially with the role o f the monitoring
142 First Report on reservations to treaties, A/CN.4/470, 1995.
143 UN Doc. A/CN.4/477/Add. 1
144 See the Resolution 50/45 o f 11 December 1995 and 51/160 o f 11 December 1996 o f the General 
Assembly. According to Alain Pellet, A/CN.4/508 (fifth report on reservations to treaties) at 3, the number o f  
replies is unsatisfactory: “replies have been received from only 33 o f the 188 States members o f the United 
Nations to which the questionnaire was sent and 24 o f the international organisations that received 
questionnaires, or 18 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively. Moreover, the replies are not evenly distributed 
geographically: they are mainly from European States (or other States in that group) (20 replies) and Latin 
American States (8 replies); and although five Asian countries have also replied, the Special Rapporteur has 
so far received no replies from any African countries. Furthermore, one o f the most active treaty-making 
international organisations, the European Communities, has yet not replied to the questionnaire sent to it**.
145 See report o f  the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-ninth session, General Assembly 
Official Records Fifty-second Session, Sup. No 10, UN Doc. A/52/10, at 95 ff. See The preliminary 
conclusions at 106 f . In the preamble, the International Law Commission declares ‘The Commission is 
aware o f the discussion currently taking place in other forums on the subject of reservations to normative 
multilateral treaties, and particularly treaties concerning human rights, and wishes to contribute to this 
discussion in the framework of the consideration o f the subject of reservations to treaties that has been before 
it since 1993 by drawing the following conclusions*’. See also SIMM A B., Op. cit. at 676 ff. “The 
Commission’s Preliminary Conclusions must certainly comes as a disappointment to human rights lawyers. 
Even though its mandate comprises not only codification proper but also the progressive development o f  
international law, the ILC has taken a conservative, pronouncedly “statist” stand on the issue o f reservations 
to human rights treaties.”
144 As declared by the International Law Commission, “1. The Commission reiterates its view that Article 19 
to 23 o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties of 1969 and 1986 govern the regime o f reservations to
37
The admissibility of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties in a Universal Context:
Who Should Determine The Validity of Reservations ? Geraldine veya
bodies in connection with appreciation of the validity of reservations made by States. The 
Commission considers that the monitoring bodies “are competent to comment upon and 
express recommendations with regard, inter alia, to the admissibility of reservations” 
(paragraph 5) but recalls however that this authority “does not exclude or otherwise affects 
the traditional modalities o f control by the contracting parties” (paragraph 6). Therefore, 
with the intention of avoiding the prior uncertainty due to the silence o f conventions, the 
Commission proposes the insertion o f “specific clauses” in case o f States are seeking “to 
confer competence on the monitoring body to appreciate or determine the admissibility o f  
a reservation” (paragraph 7). On the other hand, the lack of such express authorisation only 
permits the monitoring bodies to exercise “their power to deal with reservations” within 
the limits of “that resulting from the powers given to them for the performance of their 
general monitoring ro!e”(paragraph 8). By way of conclusion the Committee declares that
“the above conclusions are without prejudice to the practices and rules developed by 
monitoring bodies within regional contexts”(paragraph 12).
The last statement of the International Law Commission (paragraph 12) is of the utmost 
importance as regards the General Comment on reservations. As a matter o f fact, the 
exclusion of the practice o f the regional bodies from the preliminary conclusions seems to 
be a way of condemning the progressive views defended by the Human Rights Committee 
in its General Comment, insisting on the fact that the “Strasbourg approach” cannot simply 
be applied to universal instruments: the levels of integration are so different that it is 
unthinkable that the same construction be adopted on a universal or regional level.
By way of response to these Preliminary conclusions, human rights bodies as well as a few 
numbers of States147 148 commented on the views expressed by the International Law 
Commission. In brief, what clearly emerges from these replies is the necessity of not 
disregarding the practice developed by universal human rights bodies as regards the 
responsibility of the monitoring bodies to judge the permissibility o f reservations . In this
i
Vi:
it.
treaties [...]. 3. The Commission considers that these objectives [of preservation o f the integrity of the text o f 
the treaty and universality o f participation in the treaty] apply equally in the case o f reservations to normative 
multilateral treaties, including treaties in the area of human rights and that, consequently, the general rules 
enunciated in the above-mentioned Vienna Convention govern reservations to such instruments.”
M7 Five States have replied to the Preliminary conclusions: China, Monaco, Philippines, Liechtenstein, and 
Switzerland.
148 Liechtenstein proposed a consideration o f the following points: (i) Reconsideration of the correlation 
between paragraphs 5 and 7 of the preliminary conclusions; (ii) The possibility o f drafting optional protocols 
should be further elaborated upon. In doing so, the Commission should consider issues such as feasibility, 
usefulness from a practical point of view, including timeframe; (iii) Practical and concrete suggestions for the 
imminent future to remedy the current state o f affairs involving uncertainties concerning the application o f
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direction, the Chairperson o f the Human Rights Committee149 emphasised the important 
role that universal monitoring bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee play in the 
development o f rules and practices. As a consequence she declared that “it must be 
recognised that the proposition enunciated by the Commission in paragraph 10 o f  the 
preliminary conclusions150 is subject to modification as practices and rules developed by 
universal and regional monitoring bodies gain general acceptance“151.
In addition, in the ninth meeting o f the chairmen held in Geneva from 25 to 27 February 
1999, the chairpersons o f the human rights bodies recalled that human rights treaties 
“cannot be placed on precisely the same footing as other treaties with different 
characteristics” . Then they expressed their firm support “for the approach reflected in 
General Comment No. 24 o f the Human Rights Committee” and they urged that “the 
conclusions proposed by the International Law Commission should be adjusted 
accordingly to reflect that approach” 152.
Though discussions on the preliminary conclusions reveal a growing concern with the 
competence o f the universal monitoring bodies to ascertain the validity o f  reservations, the 
debate seems rather to have evolved towards the idea that the role o f  the human rights 
treaty monitoring bodies with regard to reservations should be reviewed, namely towards 
the recognition o f the fact that the human rights treaty-monitoring bodies should be given 
the competence to consider the legality o f reservations, being for the moment without such 
a jurisdiction; As a consequence, as long as the role o f the monitoring bodies is not 
enhanced, the traditional modalities o f control by the contracting parties will continue to be 
applied153. In conclusion and as pointed out Bruno Simma “the attempt by the Human
multilateral treaties, especially in the field o f human rights; (iv) Comments on the legal effect o f objections 
by States parties made to reservations lodged by other States parties; (v) Study o f the potential o f  an 
enhanced rote played by depositaries of multilateral treaties.
149 See letter dated 9 April 1998 and letter dated 5 November 1998.
150 The text of the paragraph 10 provides: “The Commission notes also that, in the event of inadmissibility o f 
a reservation, it is the reserving States that have the responsibility for taking action. This action may consist 
for example, in the State either modifying its reservation so as to eliminate the inadmissibility, or 
withdrawing its reservation, or foregoing becoming a party to the treaty”.
Ii! This paragraph is reproduced in the third report on reservations to treaties, A/CN.4/491 at §16.
152 See the letter dated 29 July 1998 by which the presiding officer o f the eighth and ninth meetings o f the 
chairmen of bodies established pursuant to human rights instruments informed the Chairman of the 
Commission of the discussions on the matter. See also fifth report on reservations to treaties, Op. c it, at 7-8. 
tS3 See for example the conclusions of the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law, first 
meeting held in Paris on 26 and 27 February 1998, about the Preliminary conclusions that read as follows: 
“The Group shared the view of the ILC that:- the regime o f the Vienna Convention is applicable to all 
treaties, including normative and human rights treaties;- the regime should not be changed. However, it was 
felt that the issue o f the role of the monitoring bodies still required further consideration; some delegations 
were not in full agreement with conclusions 5 and following [of the ILC preliminary conclusions], in
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Rights Committee to strengthen the UN system of treaty-based concern with human rights 
by extending to it the acquis reached on the regional European plane has failed, at least for 
now” * 154.
6.3 Consideration o f  the third, fourth andfifth reports on reservations to treaties
While the third report on reservations to treaties consists of two chapters dealing 
respectively with the definition of reservation155 and with the formulation and withdrawal 
of reservations, acceptances and objections156, the fourth report contains a single chapter 
recapitulating the new elements introduced since the consideration o f the second report. 
That being so, neither the third report, nor the fourth report raise any further considerations 
on the issue of the legality of reservations. The same goes for the fifth report on 
reservations to treaties, which deals with the alternative to reservations (Chapter II), the 
formulation and withdrawal o f reservations and interpretative declarations (Chapter III), 
the formulation o f acceptance of reservations (Chapter IV) and the effects of reservations, 
acceptance and objections (Chapter V). It is consequently unnecessary to consider them in 
this study157.
particular the articulation between lex lata and lex ferenda provisions”, Document CADHI (98/8) of 3 March 
1998.
154 SIMMA B., Op. ciL, at 680.
i5i Chapter II of the general outline of the study, adopted in the second report, A/CN.4/477, §37-50.
156 Chapter III of the general outline of the study, Id.
157 About the third and fourth report on reservations to treaties, see the fifth report on reservations to treaties,
A/CN.4/508, especially at 11-15.
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1 CQ
7. Ideal models: proposals de lege ferenda towards an institutionalised 
appraisal o f  the compatibility o f  a reservation with a human rights 
treaty
The regime governing the reservations should be more exacting in order to reduce the great 
number of reservations formulated in human rights treaties. As has been previously noted, 
a large number o f factors point to the need for some changes regarding the formulation and 
the acceptation of reservations by States parties. As long as human rights treaties remain 
governed by the performances o f  the States parties, rather than by a more dynamic 
approach such as the supervision o f  a judicial body or a neutral committee, States and 
governments will continue to formulate impermissible reservations. In brief, what has to be 
examined is an intermediary solution between the liberal regime defended by the 
International Law Commission and the modem trend sustained by the Human Rights 
Committee.
7.1 Prior proposals
Before going on to discuss these legal issues, it should be however noted that this concern 
is not that new: the very first to fight against the application of the established regime o f  
reservations was Sir Hersch Lauteipacht, rapporteur o f the International Law Commission, 
who proposed four alternative draft Articles, de lege ferenda158 59, in order to avoid abuses
158 On this particular subject see HYLTON D. N., Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties’ Inadequate Framework on Reservations, in: 27 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law, 1994, at 
419-451, especially at 444. According to the author, three modifications would improve the current 
framework governing reservations to treaties: “First, reversing the presumption of acceptability o f  
reservations to favour the confronted States would bar default acceptance o f reservations for non-compliance 
with technical rules and force the confronted States to either accept or object to every reservation. Second, 
adopting different frameworks for different types o f international agreements would better address the policy 
concerns for reservations to each type of agreement. In the alternative to the second suggestion, establishing 
an authoritative decision maker would depoliticize the process and better preserve the integrity o f the 
agreement”. For a development o f these suggestions, see at 445ff. See also BOWETT D. W., Op. cit. 
footnote no 40, at 81. He declares that ‘T h e  question of permissibility, since it is governed by the treaty 
itself, is eminently a legal question and entirely suitable for judicial determination and, so far as the treaty 
itself or some general treaty requiring legal settlement disputes requires the Parties to submit this type o f 
legal question to adjudication, this would be the appropriate means of resolving the question".
I.L.C. Yearbook, 1953, Vol. II, at 123-136. He proposed in his first report to the International Law 
Commission, an Article 9, de lege lata, which still provided for the application of the unanimity rule, and 
consequently, taking those considerations as unsatisfactory, presented four alternative drafts, de lege ferenda. 
See also Doc N.U. A/CN.4/63, Article 9, Draft A and B. On this subject see RUDA J.M., Op. cit. footnote no 
75, at 156: he explains in great details the work of the International Law Commission after 1951, notably the 
drafts proposed by Lauterpacht. See also ANDERSON D. R., Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, A re­
examination, in: 13 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, April 1964, at 451, esp. at 466, according 
to whom, “the great virtue of Lauterpacht’ s proposals is that they would establish certainty where previously 
there was uncertainty”. See also NAWAZ M. K., The International Law Commission’s views on the subject 
of reservations to multilateral conventions, in: 1960 Indian Journal of International Law, at 100-114.
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that could be made when formulating reservations according to the compatibility test. In 
short, the basic idea of these four proposals, essentially based on the majority rule, was to 
propose a compromise between the flexibility of the Pan-American system and the 
unanimity rule.
According to Alternative A 160, a State that formulates a reservation should wait three years 
to know whether it is considered to be a party to the convention or not. As a matter o f fact, 
the novelty is a creation o f a provisional category where reserving States are located within 
three years after their making reservations: to be deemed as a party they need a the 
approval of two-third of the parties. If, after three years, less than two-thirds of the party 
agree to the reservation, the reserving State would cease to be a party. What should also be 
noticed is that tacit acceptance might be inferred from silence.
The main criticism that could be made of the first alternative proposed by Lauterpacht is 
the uncertainty within a period of three years: States and their governments have to accept 
the likelihood of no longer being a party any longer, in the event that their reservations are 
rejected by at least one third o f the contracting parties. Moreover, there is the emergence o f 
a supplementary complication in the regime of reservations to treaties and consequently the 
aggravation of the lack o f transparency that already reigns with the de lege lata rules.161 
The second alternative, Alternative B162, however contains the advantages o f the majority 
rule without the disadvantages raised by the provisional participation.
The alternative draft C163 proposes the establishment of a special committee empowered to 
judge the validity o f the reservations made by the contracting parties. The States or the
160 Draft A\ I. The appending of a reservation is ignored for the purpose of ascertaining the number of States 
becoming parties; 2. If less than two-thirds of the parties agree to the reservation within three years, the 
reserving State is excluded and if, as a result of this, the requisite number of States for the coming into 
operation of the treaty falls below the stipulated number, the treaty is dissolved; 3. If two-thirds or more of 
the parties agree expressly or tacitly to the proposed reservation, the reserving State is deemed to be a party 
but parties can consider themselves not bound by the reserved clause in relation to the reserving State; 4. 
Tacit agreement is assumed if a State does not make a formal rejection within three months.
161 According to ANDERSON D. R., Op. cit. footnote no 159, it would be perhaps more adequate to suppress 
this provisional category and instead to consider those members as “intending members”, i.e. suspended 
members. The difference is that reserving States would not be counted as members initially but only after 
three years. The fundamental idea underlying such a system would have the merit o f being clearer than the 
one proposed by Lauterpacht.
162 Draft B: 1. Three months after notification of a proposed reservation a party is deemed to have accepted it 
if it docs not notify its disagreement; 2. The reserving State is excluded if  two-thirds of the States have not 
accepted the proposed reservation within a specified time; 3. If two-thirds or more accept the reservation, the 
reserving State becomes a party subject to the right not to apply to the reserving State the reserved clause.
163 Draft C: 1. Designation of a Committee by the parties or the organs of an international organisation 
responsible for establishing the text of the treaty; 2. The Committee would be competent to decide on the 
admissibility of reservations made by any Government subsequent to the establishment of the text of the 
treaty; 3. The text of the reservations received shall be communicated by the depositary authority to all the
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international organs, which have been created by the text o f the specified treaty, would 
appoint such a committee. As soon as a State contests the legality o f a reservation, and 
assuming that it would notify it within the three months period, the Committee would be 
competent to determine whether the reservation is permissible or not. If it is not 
admissible, the reserving state could not become a party unless the reserving State agrees 
to withdraw the reservation. This approach has both good and bad aspects: on one hand 
such a solution involves an appraisal by an organ o f the validity o f reservations instead of 
an individual decision by States, however, on the other hand, the impartiality o f  the 
Committee would remain doubtful, especially due to independence of the Committee vis-à- 
vis States parties164. However, such a disadvantage could easily be overcome by adopting 
the proposal o f Draft D, which has the merit of being a thoroughly impartial arrangement. 
As a matter o f fact, according to Alternative D 16\  the competence of judging the validity of 
a reservation should also be conferred to an organ, but to a specific one, namely the 
Chamber of Summary Procedure, designated by the International Court o f  Justice.
Though the alternative draft D appears to be the more neutral way o f appraising the 
validity of reservations, one can see how unlikely it is that States parties would accept it. 
Furthermore, to leave the decision to the International Court of Justice would involve i
longer delay and is not so “practicable” 166 a solution. On the contrary, it has been also been j
|
argued that in matters relating to reservations “elements o f dispute” are permanently ; 
present. Consequently, the issue of reservations to human rights treaties is eminently suited 1
i
i
interested States; 4. Period of three months following the receipt o f the communication to notify the 1 
depositary authority that a State disagree with reservation. If  the State does not notify on the expiry o f the 
period o f three months, it shall be deemed to have accepted it; 5. If a reservation is objected, the Committee 
shall examine the validity o f the reservation; 6. If the reservation is declared inadmissible then the State in 1 
question cannot become a party to the treaty if  it maintains the reservation. \
1MOn this particular point see ANDERSON D. R., Op. cit. footnote no 159, at 468: "Polemical argument | 
among the parties would tend to break out in the committee and perhaps even the perpetuation o f factions | 
would result”.
165 Draft D: “1. The parties or the organs o f an international organization responsible for establishing the text
of the treaty shall request the I.C J  to designate under its rules a Chamber o f Summary Procedure to decide 
on the admissibility of reservations made by a Government subsequent to the establishment of the text of the 
treaty. 2. The text o f the reservations received shall be communicated by the depositary authority to all the 
interested States. If, on the expiry o f a period o f three months following the receipt o f such communication, ’ 
an interested state does not notify the depositary authority that it disagrees with the reservation, it shall be t 
deemed to have accepted it. 3. If a reservation is objected to by a state qualified to object, then it shall be i 
competent for the Chamber of Summary Procedure, at the request o f the state making the reservation, to | 
decide whether the reservation is admissible. If the reservation is declared inadmissible then the State in j 
question cannot become a party to the treaty if  it maintains the reservation,” j
166 See the opinion o f the Honourable Justice SINHA, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, in: 1960 
Indian Journal o f International Law, Discussion, at 111.
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to being solved by a body o f permanent composition and of acknowledged 
independence167 168.
This solution of conferring the decision upon the validity o f a specific reservation to the 
International Court of Justice will be examined in greater detail further below.
Propositions made by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Sir Humphrey Waldock
By contrast, the two subsequent rapporteurs, respectively Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Sir 
Humphrey Waldock totally departed from the Lauterpacht proposals and whereas the 
former took the view that the unanimity rule would remain the only plausible system in 
order to deal with reservations, the latter favoured the adoption of a flexible system, thus 
rejecting the four alternatives proposed by Lauterpacht.
Firstly, in 1953, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, while highlighting the numerous difficulties 
linked to reservations to multilateral conventions, proposed an “ideal system'7 for the 
future . As a matter of fact, he suggested two ways of achieving it: the first solution by 
reference to a tribunal or a commission and the second solution, by the insertion of a 
reservation clause, which contains a mechanism, close to the one adopted in the 
Convention on Elimination o f all Forms of Racial Discrimination169.
However, just a few years later, in 1956, abandoning its idea o f  an “ideal system”, 
Fitzmaurice went back to the unanimity rule and submitted a report170 to the International
167 See U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/63, at 137.
168 “If, however, future United Nations Conventions are silent on the subject of reservations, and unilateral 
reservations are in fact made, the difficulties and confusions will arise”, FITZMAURICE G., Reservations to 
Multilateral Conventions, in: 2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, January 1953, at 22-23. See 
the declaration of Fitzmaurice at the time of the sixth session of the General Assembly, Doc. N.U. 
A/C.6/SR.267, § 24, in which he proposed the adoption o f the collegiate system.
m  The mechanism provided by FITZMAURICE G. states that: "(i) The texts of any reservations would be 
communicated by the Secretary-General to all interested States, which would be informed that any objections 
to the reservation concerned must be received within a limited period (or say one or two months) from the 
date o f the notification, otherwise it would be assumed that none was entertained, (ii) If one the expiry of the 
period in question, the Secretary-General was in receipt o f formal objection on the part of not less than one- 
third o f the States entitled to offer objections, the reservation would be deemed unacceptable, and the 
reserving state would be so notified, and would be informed that unless it preferred to withdraw the 
reservation, and gave notice of withdrawal within a further time limit, its instrument of ratification, accession 
or acceptance would be regarded as inoperative, but that it would be open to it at any subsequent time to 
deposit a fresh instrument, unaccompanied by the reservation, (iii) If, on the other hand, less than two-thirds 
of the States concerned offered objection, the reservation would be regarded as admitted, and the reserving 
State as being a party-subject (for what significance that might have in the case o f United Nations 
Conventions) to the right of any State which objected to the reservation not to apply the provision in respect 
of which the reservation had been made, in its relation with the reserving State, and not to accord to that State 
any benefits under that provision (insofar as the provision involved any specific relations, or the extension of 
any benefits.”, FITZMAURICE, Op. cit., at 23-24.
170 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1956, II at 115ff.
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Law Commission which only reaffirms, with minor changes, the position o f the 
Commission in 1951. For his part, Sir Humphrey Waldock171, envisaged radical changes to 
the question o f the admissibility of reservations: the principle was that a reservation that 
was not authorised by a treaty should be admitted only with the consent o f  all the parties to 
the treaty. He considered in fact that a reservation has to be thought in terms of new 
contractual offer, so that every State parties to the treaty had to implicitly or expressly 
accept the counter-offer, namely the reservation, in order to be contractually linked with 
the reserving State172 173. Regarding the adoption of a collegiate system o f  objections, he 
explains that the proposal, however attractive it seems, would tilt the balance towards
1 71inflexibility and might make general agreement on reservations more difficult.
Again, in 1958, this issue was examined within the context o f the Vienna Conference, 
which highlighted the imperfections o f  a system based on the individual judgement o f the 
validity o f  a reservation. Many alternatives were proposed among which was the adoption 
of a system based on a collective determination174. Whereas several States favoured the 
idea o f  a collective judgement o f the validity o f  a reservation, the majority o f the 
Conference voted against the proposal o f  a collegiate system.
7.2 Objective tests o f reservations validity: survey and evaluation o f  objective 
systems o f determination o f the validity o f reservations in light o f the 
compatibility principle
Assuming that there should be some impartial body which could indicate impartially 
whether a reservation is permissible or impermissible, many solutions could be envisaged, 
from a collective determination o f the validity, as has been adopted in the CERD
171 Sir Humphrey Waldock took the place o f Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice when he resigned from the International 
Law Commission due to his election as a Member o f the International Court o f Justice. The first report o f  Sir 
Humphrey Waldock was submitted in 1962 to the International Court o f Justice. See the Report to the 
International Law Commission on the Conclusion, Entry into Force and Registration o f Treaties, Yearbook 
o f the International Law Commission, 1962, at 60-68. On the work o f the Special Rapporteur see also KOH, 
Op. cit. footnote no 16, at 88-95.
,7i See Article 18, paragraph 4 (b) (ii) of the Report that provides “The consent, express or implied, of any 
other State which is a party or a presumptive party to a multilateral treaty shall suffice, as between that State 
and the reserving State, to establish the admissibility of a reservation not specifically authorised by the treaty, 
and shall at once constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty with respect to that State”.
173 Twenty-fourth meeting the International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. 2, at 189-190.
174 According to Sir Ian Sinclair “[TJhere was an obvious need for some kind of machinery to ensure that the 
test[the compatibility test] was applied objectively, either by some outside body or through the establishment 
of a collegiate system for dealing with reservations which a large group o f interested States considered to be 
incompatible with the object and purpose o f the treaty”, Twenty-first meeting of the Committee of the 
Whole, 10 April 1968, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official records, First Session, 
Summary Records o f Plenary Meetings and o f Meetings of the Committee o f the Whole, at 114.
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Convention, to the assessment o f the reservation by the International Court of Justice - or 
its subsidiary bodies - or even another body. Although there is no denying that there is 
weight and cogency to all o f these possibilities, which might appear, at first sight, to satisfy 
the requirements o f a more objective test in the determination o f a reservation's validity, it 
remains doubtful whether they are all practicable and serve to guarantee a totally impartial 
decision. Furthermore, one must not forget that States hardly consider any alternative 
methods for judging reservations, other than their sovereign right to make objections. 
Keeping in mind Lauterpacht’s draft resolution, it is now necessary to examine each of 
these possibilities in greater details, in order to make a correct appraisal o f what could be a 
reliable alternative to the Vienna Convention reservation regime.
A. the CERD model: towards a collective system 7 *1475?
One approach for promoting objectivity would involve the use o f the majority rule to 
ascertain compatibility. As a matter o f fact, the compatibility o f the reservations with the 
object and purpose test might lie in the hands of a collective determination. An 
examination of the Genocide case, as well as o f the travaux préparatoires to the Vienna 
Convention reveals that the International Court of Justice and some States already 
suggested such a mechanism for determining the validity of a reservation. Drafts A and B 
proposed by Lauterpacht were also, as seen above, an application of a collective procedure. 
This would involve a reservation only being accepted if a majority o f  States parties failed 
to lodge an objection to it on the basis o f incompatibility176 within a time limit. In other
l7i On this subject sec especially CASSESE A., A new reservation clause: Article 20 o f the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination, in: Recueil d'Etudes de droit
international en Hommage à Paul Guggenheim, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 
Genève. See also SCHWELB E., The International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, in: 15 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1966, at 996ff, especially at 1055: ‘The 
reservation clause in Particular (Article 20): ( ...)“Now Article 20 transposes the “object and purpose" 
criterion into a Convention which deliberately sets out to regulate the question of reservations and expressly 
embodies in it what would also be the law if the Convention had remained silent on it. At the same time it 
extends the “object and purpose” criterion by adding that a reservation, the effect o f which would inhibit the 
operation of any of the bodies established by the Convention shall also not be allowed."(...)”. See 
REISMAN W. M., Responses to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An appraisal o f the Convention on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in Denver Journal o f International Law and Politics, Vol.l. 1971, at 
29-64, esp. at 43-44. See also LIJNZAAD L., Op. cit., at 131ÍT.
174 During the drafting process o f the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United
Kingdom proposed a reservations clause containing a system of collective determination o f the validity of
reservations. According to the International Law Commission, the existing principles of international law 
make useless the insertion of such a reservation clause: "Plusieurs représentants ont fait observer que le droit 
de tout Etat contractant à fomuler des réserves à un traité multilatéral était désormais un principe de droit 
international accepté, à condition que ces réserves ne soient pas incompatibles avec l ’objet et le but du traité. 
Il était également bien établi que toute objection élevée contre une réserve par un autre Etat contractant 
empêchait l’entrée en vigueur du traité entre l’Etat qui faisait la réserve et l’Etat qui formulait l’objection, à 
moins que celui-ci n’ait exprimé une intention contraire. De l’avis de plusieurs membres, l’existence de ces
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words, whether a reservation is to be regarded as compatible or incompatible with a 
particular treaty’s object and purpose would depend on a required number o f States’ 
approval, either an absolute number or a percentage o f  States parties.
a) The example o f  the International Convention on the Elimination o fA ll Forms o f  
Discrimination
The only example of collective determination may be found in the Convention on the 
Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination177 178, which provides in Article 20 for the 
application o f a collegiate system, namely that “[a] reservation shall be considered 
incompatible or inhibitive i f  at least two-thirds o f  the States Parties to this Convention 
object to it" . Apart from the Racial Discrimination Convention, no other United Nations 
Conventions on human rights provide for a similar procedure in order to decide whether 
the reservation is valid or invalid.
b) The collegiate mechanism as an alternative to the Vienna Reservation regime?
The collegiate mechanism could be envisaged in the field o f  the human rights treaties as an 
alternative to the Vienna Convention reservations regime in reducing the power o f States 
to formulate impermissible reservations, by setting forth a more adequate mechanism of 
controlling the validity o f reservations. As opposed to the rules established by the Vienna 
Convention, i f  a sufficient number o f  States objected to a specific reservation, the 
reserving State with its unacceptable reservation would be excluded. As a matter o f fact, a 
required number o f States would have to agree to the State’s reservation before it could do 
so.
principes rendait inutile l ’insertion d’un Article tel que celui présenté par le Royaume-Uni.”, in U.N. Doc., 
A/C.3/SR 1412, twenty-first session, 1966, Annexes et rapport de la troisième commission, A/6546, §142- 
143. See also IMBERT, Op. cit., footnote no 72, at 411-413.
177 The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 2 1111965.
178 LIJNZAAD L. describes the content of the convention and then, more precisely the content o f  Article 20, 
Op. cit., at 131-139. The Article 20 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms o f Racial 
Discrimination provides as follows *T. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and 
circulate to all States which are or may become Parties to this Convention reservations made by the States at 
the time o f ratification or accession. Any State which objects to the reservation shall, within a period of 
ninety days from the date of the said communication, notify the Secretary-General that it does not accept i t . 
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of this Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall 
a reservation the effect of which would inhibit the operation o f any bodies established by this Convention be 
allowed. A reservation shall be considered incompatible or inhibitive if at least two-thirds o f  the States 
Parties to this Convention object to it. 3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to this 
effect addressed to the Secretary-General. Such notification take effect on the date on which it is received."
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c) The CERD model: between Unanimity and Flexibility
The first point which needs to be made is that the collegiate mechanism would appear to be 
an interesting compromise between the undermining effect of reservations on the integrity 
of the treaty, especially in a human rights treaty, and the need to maintain a flexible regime 
in order to obtain the greatest possible participation179. In this respect, this mechanism 
could be described as being halfway between the old unanimity rule and the modem 
Vienna Convention regime. As a matter o f  fact, Clark considers the collegiate mechanism 
as offering the flexibility o f  the Vienna Convention and the tyranny o f the unanimity 
system180. In this manner, States, on one hand, preserve their power to formulate 
reservations, and, on the other hand, acquire the capacity to exclude a State, as soon as a 
required number of States are convinced o f  the incompatibility o f the reservation.
Secondly, it is necessary to glance more precisely at the main differences existing between 
the Vienna Convention reservations regime and the CERD model, especially as regards to 
the compatibility test. At this point it should be recalled that there is a need to set up a 
more objective way o f ascertaining the compatibility of a specific reservation, in order to 
safeguard as much as possible the protection of human rights, namely to prevent States 
from formulating abusive reservations, as well as to avoid the lack o f willingness of States 
to object to incompatible reservations. In short, what should be examined is the efficiency 
of the collegiate mechanism in conferring a more adequate determination of compatibility, 
since, as indicated above, the Vienna reservation regime fails to provide such an objective 
mechanism.
d) The determination o f  an incompatible reservation under the CERD Model
The mechanism established by the Convention on Racial Discrimination to judge the 
validity o f a reservation does not provide for an individual determination such as that 
which is applied under the Vienna Convention reservations regime, nor for an institutional 
decision, as could be the case with, for example, an advisory opinion o f  the International 
Court o f  Justice to solve a dispute upon the admissibility on a particular reservation. 
However, to say that it is not an individual decision is perhaps not so evident: in order to
179 According to CASSESE A., Op. cit. footnote no 175 / ‘Article 20 [of the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms o f Racial Discrimination] is clearly a compromise between two contrasting 
requirements: the need for “universality of participation”, to allow the largest number o f States possible to 
become parties to a treaty and other desire for “integrity o f agreement”, to safeguard the text of the treaty in 
the form it was originally drawn up.", in A new reservation clause, at 267.
1(10 See CLARK B„ Op. cit, footnote no 46, at 298.
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consider that a specific reservation is incompatible, two-thirds o f the States parties must 
lodge an objection counter to it. In other words, each o f the two-third parties must make its 
own determination o f the validity of the reservation (first phase). In fact, the mechanism of 
the CERD Convention is a cumulation o f individual decisions of compatibility181 182, which 
could give it, perhaps, its qualification o f  being an objective mechanism.
How is incompatibility determined in the framework ofArticle 20 ?
Although this mechanism appears to be, at first glance, clearer and more transparent that 
the one provided by the Vienna Convention, it does cast doubts on what should be the 
exact content o f  the objections made by the States parties. Do States parties retain the 
faculty o f  objecting to a certain reservation on personal grounds or do they have to accept 
every reservation, except those they consider as being incompatible with the object and 
purpose o f the treaty ? Related to this first point, one might also wonder if  States parties, 
when notifying their objections to the Secretary-General, have to justify their grounds for 
objecting to reservations?
From a first point o f view, looking closely at the wording o f  Article 20, is that no matter 
what the grounds o f a State party might be, as soon as it has lodged its objection, it is 
assumed that the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. In 
short, the formulation of an objection does not necessary imply that the reservation is 
incompatible but rather that a particular State “does not accept i f * . From a second
viewpoint, shared by Antonio Cassese183, it clearly results from the interpretation o f  Article | 
20 and especially from the close connection between paragraph 1 and 2, that States parties I 
should only object to reservations when the reservation is incompatible with the object and 
purpose o f the treaty or would inhibit the operation o f any o f the bodies established by this 
Convention. Again, this statement raises the problem o f the subjective determination o f the 
compatibility o f  the reservation, each State party having a different interpretation, o f what j 
could be considered compatible or incompatible. |
181 According to LIJN2AAD L., Op. cit., at 175 the final determination is “arithmetic’*.
182 Article 20 CERD, Op. cit., footnote no 178.
183 CASSESE A., Op. cit. footnote no 175, at 274-275.
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e) Does the compatibility test become an objective test with a determination by two- 
thirds o f  the parties?
In order to achieve a complete evaluation o f the CERD mechanism, it is necessary to 
examine whether the fact that two-thirds parties are entitled to consider reservations 
formulated by other States, as either falling or not falling into one o f  the two above- 
mentioned categories (permissible and impermissible reservations) is sufficient to 
characterise the CERD mechanism, as being an objective system of determination.
In first place, comparing with the Vienna reservations regime, it is obvious that this system 
permits the avoidance of a purely individual judgement on the validity o f reservations, 
since a reservation, to be deemed valid or invalid, has to be evaluated by at least two-thirds 
of the members participating in a convention. Based on the principle o f democracy, it must 
therefore be acknowledged that, although the CERD model does not provide for an organic 
decision of compatibility, it tends objectively to apply - by two thirds determination * what 
remains a profoundly subjective test - the compatibility of the reservation with the object 
and purpose of the treaty.
However, in light o f the current practice o f States parties, several doubts are still raised by 
the so-called objective character o f such mechanism, notably by the fact that States have 
first to individually assert the validity o f a reservation. During this first phase, States may 
still wrongly apply the mechanism in question, following their own interests. As a matter 
of fact, there is apparently184 no way to prevent States parties from, either not rejecting a 
reservation, which would be contrary to the object and purpose of a treaty or inhibit the 
operation o f one o f the bodies set up by the Convention© or, on the contrary , rejecting a 
reservation which, at first sight, appears to be valid, the objection being consequently 
totally unmotivated (ii). Whereas the case (ii) is unlikely to happen, especially because, as 
mentioned above, the few objections that are usually lodged by States parties, and because 
it is not safe to assume that they will object more in the CERD framework, case (i) seems 
in fact more likely to succeed. Even though it only constitutes the first phase o f the 
determination of the validity of a reservation - the collective determination being the 
second phase- objectivity should remain a cardinal principle, in order not to render the 
mechanism useless. It is, however, hardly conceivable, despite the presupposed good faith
1M Except by having recourse to the procedure of Article 22 of the CERD Convention, which permits the 
resolution of disputes on the admissibility of reservations: a difference o f opinion could be taken to the 
International Court of Justice. However, it must be recalled that up to now, not less than twenty-nine States
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o f States parties, that these will act in an objective manner. Therefore, even in the 
framework o f  the CERD mechanism, it must be admitted that objectivity is not fully 
achieved, the rule rather creating a “pseudo-objectivity” * 185 1867.
J) The efficiency o f  CERD m odel: does it constitute an efficient alternative to the 
Vienna reservations regime ?
Despite its description as being “an ideal way out” , especially in the human rights field, 
the collegiate mechanism system fails to prevent States parties from formulating 
undesirable and incompatible reservations, at least for three main reasons: first o f  all, it 
must be emphasised that such a mechanism does not provides for an express acceptation of 
a specific reservation made by a State. On the contrary, the current framework o f  the 
CERD presumes the tacit acceptance o f  States parties™1. There is a presumption that the 
reservation is accepted unless two thirds o f the States parties have objected to it . As a 
result, a State’s failure either to object to or to accept a reservation would automatically 
lead to the acceptation o f the reservation, favouring, as Daniel Hylton rightly points out, 
the reserving State and its reservation189. Thanks to the rule o f tacit acceptance, what 
becomes more important is less the provocation of the formulation o f a too large number of
have reserved Article 22 CERD. See further below an overview of States practice. On this particular point 
see also CASSESE A., Op. cit., at 276-277 and CERD/C/SR.253.
185 LIJNZAAD L., Op. cit., at 175.
186 See IMBERT P.-H., Les réserves et les dérogations, La question des réserves et les conventions en matière 
de droits de l'homme, in Actes du cinquième colloque international sur la Convention européenne des droits 
de l’homme, Francfort, 9-12 avril 1980, at 98fT, esp. at 126: “Le système majoritaire a toujours été présenté 
comme une solution miracle, un système idéal." Imbert declared also that the success of this mechanism 
could be easily explained: “IPJour les anciens partisans du système classique, la règle majoritaire est celle qui 
s’en approche le plus. Elle permet d’exercer un contrôle sérieux sur les réserves, et n’engendre aucune 
situation ambiguë: elle s’applique automatiquement et le statut de l’Etat réservataire comme celui du traité 
(du point de vue de son entrée en vigueur) sont toujours bien établis. En outre, les traités étant à l’heure 
actuelle adoptés au scrutin majoritaire, il semble normal qu’un principe comparable s ’applique à 
l’acceptation d’une réserve. Enfin, cette règle apparaît comme la meilleure solution de compromis, en raison 
de l’assouplissement qu’elle représente et qui supprime le risque de décision arbitraire, principal défaut du 
consentement unanime. Elle peut ainsi rallier de nombreux Etats qui, tout en étant opposés au système 
classique, redoutent les dangers d’une procédure trop libérale qui donne à chaque Etat intéressé la possibilité 
de formuler individuellement un jugement sur la validité de la réserve’*, Op. cit., footnote no 125, at 142-143.
187 According to HYLTON D. N-, Op. cit. footnote no 158, at 445, prior to the Vienna Convention, 
reservations to treaties were presumed impermissible and unacceptable, whether under the unanimity rule, 
the Pan-American System, the principle of the Genocide Convention, or the collegiate system.
188 CASSESE A., Op. cit., at 267 see the presumption as set up in the CERD Convention as an advantage: “in 
this way no single contracting State could prevent a reserving State from participating in the Convention”.
See also SHERMAN E F. JR, Op, cit. footnote no 55, at 92, who proposes that the rule o f tacit acceptance | 
should be replaced with a procedure that would require every state party to a treaty to respond in a set fashion | 
to each o f a ratifying party’s reservation. He suggests that the rule should provides that “A reservation is | 
incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty if two-thirds o f the state parties object to the reservation  ^
as such. It is required that when a State enters a proposed reservation, every party to the treaty must respond ■ 
to the reservation within twelve months of the entry o f the reservation.”
189 HYLTON D. N., Op. cit., footnote no 158, at 445. !
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objections rather than the obtaining o f a certain majority in favour190. However, in order to 
improve the regime governing reservations to human rights instruments, it might perhaps 
be advisable either to reverse the presumption, or to compel States to reach a decision on 
every reservation, and moreover within a brief time limit. By doing so, it will be possible 
to remedy the fact that “it is the passage o f time that establishes compatibility rather than 
an explicit determination” 191. As a matter of fact, it might have been thought possible to 
envisage the reversal o f the presumption o f  tacit acceptance, proposing a new reservations 
clause; such a new reservations clause may provide that a reservation which has not been 
accepted by two third o f the States parties192 is considered as being incompatible with the 
object and purpose o f the Convention. However, it must be stressed that, even in this case, 
the acceptation of a reservation would not necessarily mean that a reservation is 
compatible with the object and the purpose o f the treaty but rather that an assumption of 
compatibility is established193.
As a consequence o f such a rule, what ultimately matters is the number o f objections made 
by the States parties, which always remains very low: taking the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination as an example, it must be stressed that 
the number of objections has never reached the required majority194. Therefore, it seems 
evident that such a system is not particularly adequate as far as human rights treaties are 
concerned: reservations are considered invalid only if a certain number o f States have 
objected and unfortunately they never do so 195.
Moreover, and this is the second point, in case where objections do not achieve the 
required majority, the reserving State becomes a party to the Convention, with the benefit
1,0 On this subject see IMBERT P.H., Op. cit., footnote no 186, at 146. Sec also Doc. A/CONF. 39/C.l/SR. 
24, §9: Sir WALDOCK H. explained why such a mechanism could remain theoretical since States do not 
readily lodge objections to reservations.
191 UJNZAAD L., Op. cit, at 175.
192 In this manner States parties will have to expressly accept the reservations, which is more in conformity 
with the spirit of the human rights conventions.
193 On this subject see GRAEFRATH B., Menschenrechte und Internationale Kooperation, Berlin, 1988, at 
70.
194According to UJNZAAD L., Op. cit., “It should be noted that all reservations have been accepted, as the 
number o f objections never amounted to two-thirds of the States Parties." Lijnzaad affirms that the number of 
objections depends not only of the intention of States but also of the problem of the relatively short period 
available for objections. Yet the objections should be communicated in a ninety-day period provided for in 
Article 20.1 CERD.
195 For instance, see the Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of Racial Discrimination: States parties 
to the Convention have formulated a host of reservations, whereas only two have been objected. The first one 
concerns the reservation to Article 5 (that contains a catalogue of rights) made by the Yemen Arab Republic 
and to which 14 States have objected, and the second one to be mentioned is the Pakistani objection to the 
Indian reservation to Article 22 which deals with the dispute-settlement provision. See ST/LEG/SER.E/11.
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of its reservation, which is therefore considered as to be compatible with the purpose and 
the object o f the treaty. As a consequence, it would imply that the State which had raised 
an objection to the reservation, will be considered to be bound by the treaty except by the 
provision to which a reservation has been lodged. It clearly appears from this that every 
time a reservation does not lead to the objections o f two-thirds of the States parties, and I 
this has until now always been the case, the collegiate system also provides for a liberal j 
regime o f reservations close to the one adopted by the Vienna Convention. Again, 
considering a reservation which is manifestly incompatible with the object and purpose of 
a treaty, and assuming that fewer than two-thirds o f the States parties have objected to it, j
the reservation will nevertheless be considered valid. I
i
The third reason why the collective mechanism should not be adopted as an alternative to 
the Vienna Convention reservations regime as regards human rights treaties is the | 
increased number o f States required to object to a reservation: accordingly to the two-third ! 
rule, the more States ratify the Convention, the more States have to object to a reservation j 
in order to exclude a State from the Convention. As Lijnzaad rightly pointed out in 
connection with the CERD procedure, “the protective value o f the two-thirds rule 
diminishes as more States become parties to the CERD”196. This statement is verified by | 
the fact that, as already explained, not even one single reservation has provoked the ! 
formulation o f objections by two-thirds o f all the States parties to the Convention. As will [
i
be seen, when examining the current practice of the States parties to the CERD convention, 
even the more controversial reservations - reservations formulated counter to Article 5 of 
the CERD convention - have been objected to only by a small number o f States parties.
g) The current practice o f  the States parties to the CERD : a survey o f  reservations J
and objections197 j
I
In the following, effective reservations and objections made to this particular convention I 
will be discussed to find out whether the innovations of the CERD model have positive j 
effects on the quality and the number o f  reservations and objections made to human rights 
treaties.
196 LIJNZAAD L.f Op. cit., at 136, explains that “though the rule remains unchanged, the number of states j
necessary to establish incompatibility according to 20(2), two-thirds o f the ratifying states, necessarily j
increases. Thus, the rule has an intrinsic flexibility that implies a loss o f control, proportional to the growing j
number o f States parties”. On this subject see also CLARK B., Op. cit., at 298. (
197 On this subject see LIJNZAAD L., Op. cit., at 140ff. (
f
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Among the one hundred and fifty-three States parties to the Racial Discrimination 
Convention198, forty-four States parties have, up to now, formulated at least one 
reservation to an Article or a provision o f that Convention. Briefly, the Article to which the 
most reservations have been lodged by States parties is, not surprisingly, Article 22 o f the 
CERD Convention199, a procedural Article that provides for the compulsory jurisdiction o f 
the International Court o f  Justice. Another provision which has also met with a high 
number o f reservations is Article 4 of the CERD Convention200. Amazingly, not even one 
objection has been lodged towards those reservations. The only reservations that have been 
objected to are the broad reservations formulated by the Governments o f  Yemen and Saudi 
Arabia to Article 5 of the Convention, which provides for a genuine catalogue o f human 
rights201. Despite the fact that these reservations were clearly incompatible with the object
198 See Multilateral Treaty Series, Op. cit., at 103 (French Version).
199 Twenty-two States parties have formulated a reservation counter to Article 22 o f the CERD Convention. 
See the table, Op. cit., at 42-43.
200 Eighteen States parties have formulated a reservation counter to Article 4 of the CERD Convention. See 
the table, Op. cit., at 42-43. Article 4 of the CERD Convention provides that: “States Parties condemn all 
propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority o f one race or group of 
persons o f one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination 
in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, 
or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in Article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) 
Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race 
or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist 
activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also 
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall 
recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; (c) Shall not 
permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.”
01 Two States parties have formulated a reservation counter to Article 5 o f the CERD Convention. See the 
table, Op. cit., at 42-43. Article 5 of the CERD Convention provides that "In compliance with the 
fundamental obligations laid down in Article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to 
eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to 
race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following 
rights:(a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice; (b) The 
right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by 
government officials or by any individual group or institution; (c) Political rights, in particular the right to 
participate in clections-to vote and to stand for election-on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take 
part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to 
public service; (d) Other civil rights, in particular: (i) The right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the border of the State; (ii) The right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's 
country; (iii) The right to nationality; (iv) The right to marriage and choice of spouse; (v) The right to own 
property alone as well as in association with others; (vi) The right to inherit; (vii) The right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; (viii) The right to freedom of opinion and expression; (ix) The right to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association;(e) Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular: (i) The 
rights to work, to free choice o f employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against 
unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable remuneration; (ii) The right to form and 
join trade unions; (iii) The right to housing; (iv) The right to public health, medical care, social security and 
social services; (v) The right to education and training; (vi) The right to equal participation in cultural 
activities;(f) The right of access to any place or service intended for use by the genera] public, such as 
transport hotels, restaurants, cafes, theatres and parks.”
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and purpose o f the treaty, and also in spite o f the significant number o f  States that have 
declared that they consider them to be incompatible, the strict application of the two-thirds 
rule has not lead them to be judged as being incompatible. As a matter of fact, fifteen 
States202 have lodged an objection, namely less than ten per cent o f States parties. 
Consequently, one must admit that the collegiate mechanism adopted by the CERD 
convention also does not provide for a suitable remedy for the avoidance of impermissible 
reservations. r
B. The competence o f the International Court ofJustice to ascertain the validity o f  
reservations
A second proposal for remedying the vacuums in the Vienna Convention reservations 
regime would be for the International Court of Justice to be given the jurisdiction to take a 
decision on the admissibility o f the reservations formulated counter to human rights 
treaties. This proposal will be examined further below, in connection with the usual 
reluctance of States to accept the compulsory jurisdiction o f  the International Court of 
Justice, as well as in connection with the difficulties o f  application that may be involved by 
the adoption o f such mechanism: the competence of the Court, the legitimacy of 
intervention and the relatively long delays necessary to obtain a decision.
a) The reluctance o f  States to accept the compulsory jurisdiction o f  the International
Court o f  Justice
Admittedly, States have always shown a marked unwillingness203 to accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction o f international tribunals, even more so than usual in the field o f human rights: 
the lack o f commercial interests has always prevented States from considering the human 
rights objectives as being erga omnes obligations. As far as the International Court of 
Justice is concerned, it is true that quite a large number o f  States have until now not 
accepted the optional clause. Furthermore, even where the International Court o f  Justice 
has jurisdiction over disputes related to a specific Convention (under a provision in the 
relevant convention); States parties could formulate reservations against the compulsory 
jurisdiction o f the I.C.J. Two examples could be examined in this connection. The first one 
concerns the Genocide Convention, the great majority o f reservations to which refer to
202 The objecting States are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
55
)
Î
I
j
1
i
i
i
i
I
\
\
i
»
»
\
)
»
i
i
l
à
The admissibility of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties in a Universal Context:
who Should Determine The Validity of Reservations ? Geraldine Veya
Article IX, which deals with the compulsory jurisdiction o f the International Court of 
Justice203 04. The example o f the CERD Convention, as a second example, also illustrates the 
reluctance of States parties to empower an international tribunal without express consent to 
be given in each particular case. As seen above, the dispute settlement clause, under which 
there is a possibility of individually referring a dispute either to arbitration or to the 
International Court o f Justice has been rejected by several States parties. It is true that 
States parties strongly prefer to make a determination ex post of the competence of the 
International Court o f Justice in light o f any disputes that may arise: many of the twenty- 
nine States which have formulated a reservation counter to Article 22 o f the Convention on 
Racial Discrimination have also declared that the express consent of all the parties to the 
dispute will be necessary205.
b) Efficiency o f  the 1CJ model in the determination o f  the validity o f  reservations
The whole problem in knowing whether the International Court o f Justice is a suitable 
organ for deciding on the admissibility o f a reservation is therefore totally dependent on 
the faculty of convincing States to accept the optional clause or the specific treaty 
provision giving jurisdiction to the Court. As long as States continue almost systematically 
to reject the compulsory jurisdiction o f the International Court of Justice, the proposal 
seems hardly to be feasible: o f what relevance will a system be under which the Court 
cannot decide an issue unless the parties to a dispute have accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court? This would mean that whereas in some rare cases the Court will 
be considered to be competent to judge the legality o f a reservation - especially where all 
the parties to the disputes have expressly given their consent - its competence will most of 
the time be denied, with the consequence of raising major uncertainties and especially to 
show no consistent pattern.
Moreover, referring to the possibility o f  inserting a specific provision providing for the 
competence of the Court to judge the legality of the reservations, what will be the 
consequences if a State formulates a reservation counter to that provision? Will the Court
203 According to Anderson “it must be admitted that in practice the history of States’ willingness (or their 
lack o f it) to refer issues to the International Court is far from encouraging and in view of this it seems 
unlikely that many States would favour this draft [Draft D]’\  Op. cit., at 468.
204 To find the texts of the reservations and objections to reservations to the Genocide Convention, see Status 
of Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary General, in United Nations, Office of legal Affairs, 
Treaties Section, at http: //www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/bible.htm.
205 See reservations formulated by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, India, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Madagascar, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Syria, and Yemen.
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be competent to judge the legality o f a reservation that precisely contests that competence? 
According to Article 36 paragraph 6 o f the Statute o f the International Court o f Justice, the 
Court is competent also “in the event o f a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction”. 
However, in order to avoid the intricacies o f such a proposal, it would perhaps be more 
appropriate to simultaneously insert a reservation clause prohibiting the formulation of 
reservations counter to that specific provision. In this way States will have to accept the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court o f  Justice i f  they want to become parties 
to the treaty. There are however some significant risks that States may refuse to ratify 
human rights treaties that contain such clauses.
Conferring the judgement of the validity o f reservations made to human rights conventions 
on the International Court o f Justice would first give authority as well as legitimacy to the 
decisions of validity or invalidity o f reservations: as Anderson rightly points out, the 
advantages o f a decision taken by an international tribunal which is already constituted and 
whose high standards are already accepted must be obvious to any lawyer206. Moreover, 
referring disputes related to reservations to the International Court o f Justice would 
involve, on one hand, an objective as well as impartial decision o f  compatibility, 
undoubtedly more in line with the goals o f human rights treaties, but it would on the other 
hand risk complicating to a significant degree the mechanism of determination207, 
especially due to the rather long delays in the intervention o f the International Court of 
Justice. As a matter o f fact, it is hardly conceivable that States can be made to wait for the 
decision o f the International Court o f Justice, with the consequence that States parties to a 
specific convention on human rights would not know until that decision their precise 
obligations under that convention, especially in their relationship with other States parties.
In order to remedy the “impracticability” o f this solution o f asking the International Court 
o f Justice to render a decision upon the validity o f a reservation, two other alternatives, 
however still within the framework of the International Court o f  Justice, could at this point 
be examined: the first possibility is to ask the International Court o f Justice for an advisory 
opinion on the compatibility o f certain reservations with UN human rights instruments, 
while the second possibility is to establish a special chamber o f the International Court, 
only responsible for judging the compatibility of the reservations. Both possibilities take 
advantage o f the impartiality as well as the objectivity o f the framework o f the
206 ANDERSON D. R., Op. cit., footnote no 27, at 468.
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International Court o f Justice, while also seeming more practical in the sense that they will 
notably avoid the interminable delays o f intervention of the Court.
c) The solution o f  the Advisory opinion
The solution of the Advisory opinion has already been proposed, in 1993, by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women* 208, which supported the 
idea o f asking the International Court o f Justice for an advisory opinion on the 
compatibility of certain reservations with UN human rights instruments. Evén if  the 
solution o f the advisory opinion could present the advantage o f  indirectly affecting States 
which have not necessarily consented to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction209, this 
problem is mitigated by the following specific points: (i) The first reason why the 
mechanism of the advisory opinion should be considered not to be suitable to address the 
issue o f the validity o f reservations is that States cannot request an advisory opinion: only 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Security Council and such other organs of 
the United Nations and of the specialised agencies authorised by the General Assembly can 
request an advisory opinion, (ii) The second reason that leads to a refutation o f the 
mechanism of the advisory opinion as an alternative to the Vienna Convention reservations 
regime is the discretionary power of the International Court of Justice to accept or to 
decline requests for advisory opinions. According to the Article 65 o f the Statute o f the 
International Court o f Justice, “the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal 
request”210. Therefore, even if  a request for an advisory opinion should not, in principle, be 
refused211, this eventuality should be taken into account, (iii) The third reason for rejecting 
the mechanism of the advisory opinion as a means to determine the validity o f reservations 
is linked to the effect of the advisory opinions. Despite the fact that they obviously possess 
a great persuasive influence and authority, advisory opinions are technically not binding on 
the parties, (iv) The general character o f the advisory jurisdiction may be the fourth reason 
for not considering advisory opinions as offering a reliable means for the judging o f the
20/ According to Honourable Justice SINHA “it would clearly be not practicable to leave the decision to the 
ICJ”, in: Indian Journal o f International Law, Op. cit.f footnote no 166 at 111.
208 See the CEDAW report on the work of its twelfth session, ON. Doc. A/48/38,28 May 1993, at §3, 5.
209 The consent of individual States who may be affected by a request of an Advisory opinion, or who may be 
involved in a dispute to which that request refers is not necessary in order to enable the Court to give the 
Opinion, FITZMAUR1CE, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, Grotius Publications 
Limited, Vol. I, 1986, at 114.
2,0 See also Article 96, paragraph 1 of the Charter.
211 According to the International Court of Justice, Advisory opinion on Reservations to Treaties, Op. cit. 
footnote no 15,1951, at 19, “the Court has the power to decide whether the circumstances of a particular case 
such as to lead the Court to decline to reply to the request for an Opinion”.
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validity of reservations. It has frequently been maintained that all requests for advisory 
opinions should be formulated in abstract terms, even if they are motivated by a concrete
n i  A
situation in order to avoid quasi-contentious jurisdiction . If it were the case, although the 
Court seems to negate this view21 13 214*6, the technique of the advisory opinion would be useless 
when applied to the determination o f the validity of a particular reservation.
d) The designation o f  a special chamber2,4
A reasonable alternative to that proposal would be, and that was precisely the suggestion 
already proposed by Lauterpacht in his Draft D, to request the International Court of 
Justice to set up a special chamber , designated under its own rules, able to decide on the 
admissibility o f  reservations and act in a rather more summary way. The advantage of 
specially establishing the Chamber o f  Summary Procedure is that this Chamber acts in
A l  /
accordance with simplified procedures , thereby offering to the States a specialised and 
more rapid way o f  determining the validity of a reservation217. Moreover, by adopting such 
a mechanism for controlling the validity o f reservations, impartiality and objectivity seem 
to remain guaranteed, the rules o f designation being the same as those o f  the International 
Court o f Justice. However, as pointed out Rosenne, in the past, only one case has ever been 
brought before this Chamber and this unique experience failed to demonstrate the value of 
these particular Chambers as well as the preference of States to prefer for Chambers as 
opposed to the full Court218 *.
212 See Judge Azevedo, First Admissions case, 1948, at 73-75.
213 See the First Admission Case, 1948, at 61.
214 According to ROSENNE S., The International Court of Justice, An essay in Political and Legal Theory, 
Ledyen A. W. SijthofFs Uitgeversmaatschappij N. Nv, 1957, at 154, “[T]he Statute also envisages the 
possibility of cases being decided by smaller collectivities of judges than the full Court, collectivities known 
under the appellation “Chamber”. The Statute provides for two types o f  Chambers, those with a jurisdiction 
limited to a particular type of case or even a particular case, and a Chamber of Summary Procedure with 
general jurisdiction”.
15 See the Statute o f the International Court o f Justice, Article 29 which provides: “ With a view to the 
speedy despatch of business, the Court shall form annually a chamber composed of five judges which, at the 
request o f the parties, may hear and determine cases by summary procedure. In addition, two judges shall be 
selected for the purpose o f replacing judges who find it impossible to sit”.
216 See Section 2 of the Rules of the Court, Adopted on May 6th, 1946, Article 72.
2.7 According to ROSENNE S., Op. cit., at 155, “it is difficult to see what is the particular advantage of these
specialised Chambers, or the Chamber for Summary Procedure, over the more orthodox type o f arbitration, 
which is always useful when what is required is expert and perhaps technical knowledge in a limited sphere 
rather than broad general competence in international law and practice as a whole, which is the special 
attribute o f the Court”.
2.8 ROSENNE S., Op. cit., at 155.
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C. Decisions on admissibility conferred on a Committee o f  experts
The suitable organ to decide on the admissibility o f  reservations could also be a Committee 
to which the parties would refer disputes on a particular reservation. Such a committee 
could be envisaged in various forms: a centralised monitoring mechanism composed of 
independent experts empowered to judge the legality of all the reservations made to the 
United Nations Conventions on human rights, as well as a Committee designated by the 
States parties - or an organ o f  an international organisation responsible for establishing the 
text of the treaty - to a specific Convention, or even to the Legal Committee of the General 
Assembly. However, the competence o f the treaty-based organs, such as the Human Rights 
Committee, will not be examined here, having already been discussed above.
a) The experience o f the Council o f  Europe
Up to a certain extent, the creation of a committee composed o f experts has already been 
achieved within the framework o f the reservations concluded within the Council of 
Europe. As a matter o f fact, the most recent effort o f the Council of Europe in combatting 
inadmissible reservations finds expression in the creation of an “observatory of
reservations”, in the framework of the existing Committee of Legal Advisers on Public 
International Law 2I9(CADHI). This Committee, though composed o f representatives of 
the States parties, is also assisted by a Group of Experts on Reservations to International 
Treaties220 which was established in 1997, and whose members are specialists, but also 
countries and international organisations with the statute of observers221. According to the 
mandate conferred by the Committee of Ministers, the major task of the group of experts is 
to “assist the CADHI in its role as an European observatory of reservations, i.e. in 
examining reservations and reactions to reservations to multilateral treaties o f significant 
I importance to the international community222. The Group should examine and bring
2,9 The Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (hereinafter CADHI) is “a pan-European 
forum where high level representatives of the Ministries o f Foreign Affairs of all member states o f the 
Council o f  Europe exchange information, discuss and now also co-ordinate issues of common-interest in the 
field o f public international law”, AXERMARK S. S., Op. cit., footnote no 9, at 511.
! 220 The abbreviation is DI-E-RIT.
221 For an example of international organisations that are invited to the meetings, there are the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law as well as the Commission o f the European Community. The 
I countries that are present to the meetings are essentially: Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Canada, Japan,
I Mexico, United States of America.
m  The Group will have to “(a) examine and propose ways and means and, possibly, guidelines to assist 
member States in developing their practice regarding their response to reservations and interpretative 
I declarations usually or potentially inadmissible under international law and (b) consider the possible role of
I the CADHI as an “observatory” o f reservations to multilateral treaties o f significant importance to the
f international community raising issues as to their admissibility under international law, and as an observatory
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attention o f the CADHI reservations and declarations which raise issues as to their 
admissibility from the point o f view o f international law and in particular from a human 
rights perspective”223. The activities o f co-operation with other international entities224, 
dissemination o f information and exchange of views, as well as the establishment of 
reports are also part of the work o f the Group of experts.
Even though the creation of that Group o f Experts undoubtedly leads to some favourable 
changes in the monitoring o f potentially or actually not valid reservations, it should be 
noted that, on the contrary, it does not bring any innovations as to the existing regime of 
determination o f the validity o f reservations: the Group o f experts facing with an 
impermissible reservation could only formulate recommendation in order to obtain the 
withdrawal or modification o f the reservation. In fact, the creation o f the Group o f  experts 
does not prevent the mechanism of individual determination by the means o f objections 
from being still applied in the judging o f the validity o f reservations.
b) What form  could be envisagedfor a Committee o f  experts?
In order to satisfy the requirements o f objectivity and impartiality, the formation o f a 
Committee of experts must at least observe the following principles: first, it should be 
composed of specialists and not of representatives o f  the States parties to assure on one 
hand their knowledge o f the matter o f  reservations to human rights treaties and one the 
other hand, their total independence. Such independence is absolutely necessary in order to 
obtain a complete depoliticization o f  the matter o f  the determination o f  the legality of 
reservations to human rights treaties, avoiding thus the political influences that m ay arise 
in a political forum. This is also one o f  the reasons why the proposal that the General 
Assembly could entrust the Legal Committee225 with the competence to determine the 
validity o f  reservations is not suitable: the Legal Committee on which all the members of 
the United Nations are represented is not able to decide impartially whether reservations 
are compatible or not with a given treaty. Second, the election o f the Committee should be 
organised in a democratic way, with the participation o f  the members of the United
of reactions by Council o f Europe member States Parties to these instruments”, see the introductory 
documents, first meeting, DI-S-RIT (98)1, Strasbourg, 2 February 1998.
223 AKERMARK S. S., Op. cit. footnote no 9, at 511.
224 The Group met the special Rapporteur Alain Pellet of the International Law Commission during its first 
working year, in 1998.
225 See the proposal o f  the Honourable Justice Sinha, Op. c it footnote no 166, at 111. See also the proposal 
of Fenwick, C. G. FENWICK, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions: the Report of the International Law
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Nations. This inevitably raises the question of how it may be possible to ensure that the 
members of the United Nations will act in a totally independent way in electing the 
required number of independent experts, especially taking into account that experts would 
come from the States parties to the United Nations. Linked to that question is the difficulty 
of finding a means by which so high a number o f  members could democratically elect a 
relatively low numbers of experts.
Examination.of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism: a model to be adopted in human . 
rights treaties?
One mechanism that may be examined in the course o f determining how to set up a totally 
independent group o f experts is that provided by the World Trade Organisation226 when, a 
dispute occurring between States, it becomes necessary to designate experts to be members 
of a particular panel. The WTO dispute settlement system offers a relatively simple and 
rapid procedure, generally well accepted by States since that mechanism seems to have 
been used more frequently than any other international institution for the settlement of 
disputes among states227.
What is strongly relevant for the purpose o f this study is the manner by which panels are 
established in order to ensure the independence and the impartiality o f panel members. In 
brief, the parties to a dispute have the right, sixty days after the first stage o f negotiation, to 
seek the setting up o f a panel by the WTO. Usually panels have three members, none of 
which comes from the countries concerned, designated by the WTO Secretariat on the 
basis o f  a list of the potential panel members. If one of the parties to the dispute rejects a 
panel member, the Director-General should arrange a new panel within sixty days228. The 
;l authority o f the panels’ decision is firstly due to the fact that States have absolutely no role 
| in the designation o f the members, as it was the case before. Secondly, this is ensured by 
I the fact that with a view to perfectly ensuring the independence o f panelists, it is expressly 
specified that “panelists shall serve in their individual capacities and not as government 
representatives, nor as representatives of any organisation’’229. Thirdly, this is also
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Commission, Editorial Comment, in: 46 American Journal oflntemational Law, 1952, at 119-123, esp. at 
122.
: 226 Hereinafter: WTO
il 227 For a statistical evaluation of the panel’s deliberations see HUDEC, 1993.
| 228 Articles 8(§6) and 8(§7) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
I Disputes.
I 229 See Article 8(§9) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
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guaranteed by the requirements on the qualification and knowledge o f the panelists who 
shall possess “a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience”.
Such a dispute settlement mechanism being the result o f a well established integration 
process, it could not, as such, be automatically transposed to the issue o f reservations to 
human rights treaties. However, the procedure adopted, especially as regards the 
establishment as well as the composition o f panels, should be considered a precious 
guideline when elaborating a proposal to elect a committee responsible for judging the 
validity o f  reservations formulated counter to all United Nations conventions on human 
rights.
As a matter o f fact, the General Assembly might be requested to elect a permanent 
committee of experts on the basis of a pre-determined list o f potential members possessing 
the qualifications required, proposed by States and international organisations. Then, the 
members of this committee will be granted the independence necessary for the 
performance o f their task without any interference from their respective governments. It 
should also be provided that members whose governments are concerned with that dispute 
shall not participate in the debate in order to ensure complete objectivity. The possibility of 
creating panels should also be envisaged. Last, but not least, the committee should have the 
competence to give an opinion on whatever reservations formulated counter to a human 
rights convention as soon as a State or an international organisation casts doubts on the 
validity o f a particular reservation.
Convenient as this may be, it is not realistic, and the same conclusion has already been 
drawn in relation with to potential competence o f the International Court of Justice, to 
imagine that States would accept the endowing of a committee with the responsibility of 
determining the validity of reservations made to human rights treaties. As a matter of fact, 
States would more easily accept being deprived o f some o f  their competence when they 
have particular interests in doing so, as for example in the matter of international trade.
8. Concluding observations on the proposal to establish an objective 
means o f  determining the validity o f  reservations to human rights 
treaties
This paper has argued that the Vienna Convention reservations regime does not have the 
effect o f  avoiding impermissible reservations and therefore that this regime should not be 
applied to human rights treaties. As such, in order to protect the human rights treaties from
63
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abusive reservations, the establishment o f  an objective mechanism for controlling the 
validity of reservations has been proposed. However, even if the necessity of rethinking the 
flexible system that governs the validity o f reservations to human rights treaties has been 
widely demonstrated, there are significant risks that States will refuse to adhere to a system 
that will deprive them of their sovereign right to make reservations.
The cardinal principle o f international law being that a sovereign independent State is only 
bound to the extent to which it has consented, and referring to the proposals that have been 
studied in this paper, it is barely conceivable that States will either grant jurisdiction to the 
Court International o f Justice to decide on the validity of reservations, or agree to the 
establishment o f a special committee empowered to judge the validity o f reservations. 
Moreover, the competence o f the treaty monitoring bodies to control the validity of 
reservations cannot be derived from their actual powers. In order to have authority to 
decide on validity of reservations, the treaty monitoring bodies should be given an explicit 
delegation by the States themselves. This possible extension o f the competence o f the 
monitoring bodies should be a matter for further discussion within the context o f the work 
of the International Law Commission on the subject of reservations to treaties. In this 
connection, a system o f collaboration between States and monitoring bodies might be also 
envisaged. The treaty monitoring bodies should be at least given the power to comment 
upon and express recommendations with regard to the validity o f reservations, while the 
responsibility and the competence to take action on impermissible reservations should 
remain in the hands o f States. Thus, the monitoring bodies would have the power to 
consult the reserving State and the other States parties about the validity o f a reservation, 
but would leave to the States parties the right to make their determination on the 
reservation on the basis of the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties. This seems to be 
the only reasonable way to make a step towards a more objective means o f ascertaining the 
validity o f reservations.
As for the proposal o f the adoption of a collegiate mechanism, it has been seen that even if 
it seems to be a good suggestion based on the principle o f democracy, its application does 
not permit the avoidance of impermissible reservations.
In conclusion, as no complete solution for the establishment o f an objective means of 
judging the validity o f reservations seems to be feasible, it might be necessary to make the 
following recommendations: first o f all, one o f  the most effective approaches in 
combatting impermissible reservations would be to encourage States parties to react to the
64
m s s
The admissibility of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties in a Universal Context:
who Should Determine The Validity of Reservations ? Geraldine veya
reservations that have been formulated. This would probably have the effect of reducing 
the number o f impermissible reservations to which no objections are made. A further step 
would be to force  States parties to react to reservations: the rule of tacit consent could be 
replaced with an obligation for every State party to respond to reservations. Admittedly, 
replacing the rule o f tacit consent, for example within the framework o f  the collegiate 
mechanism, would undoubtedly lead to a more effective system o f judging the validity of 
reservations. If States were compelled to react to reservations, the application of the two- 
thirds rule certainly would provoke the rejection o f certain incompatible reservations. 
Second, it would be highly desirable that all future conventions on human rights expressly 
provide for either the inclusion of a reservation clause or the adoption of a dispute 
settlement mechanism relating to reservations. This does not mean that previous 
conventions on human rights could not adopt protocols in order to achieve the same 
results. Thirdly, it could also be recommended that the validity o f reservations to human 
rights treaties be limited to a maximum period of a certain number of years, as for example 
five or ten years. Finally, and linked to the previous point, States should be encouraged to 
withdraw their reservations as soon as possible.
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